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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of compensation committee 
composition on the level of CEO compensation. The composition of the compensation 
committee is analyzed by using five variables which are: 1) the proportion of non-
independent directors, 2) the proportion of long-serving directors, 3) the proportion of 
CEO-directors, 4) the proportion of busy directors and 5) the presence of a blockholder 
on the compensation committee. CEO compensation is measured by using three 
instruments which are base salary, cash compensation and total compensation. 
   
 
DATA 
 
Data set consists of the companies that were listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki in 
September 2011 and used a compensation committee in their internal governance at 
some point between 2006 and 2009. After the necessary eliminations the final sample 
comprised of 177 firm-year observations. All the independent variables are from the 
years 2006-2009, while the dependent variable is from the years 2007-2010. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results point out that the proportion of non-independent directors has a statistically 
highly significant negative effect on the level of CEO base salary and CEO cash 
compensation. The proportion of long-serving directors has a statistically significant 
negative effect on CEO cash compensation and especially on total CEO compensation. 
Finally, the proportion of busy directors has a statistically significant negative 
relationship with CEO base salary. The proportion of CEO-directors and the presence of 
a blockholder on the compensation committee have no statistically significant 
relationship with CEO compensation.  
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PALKITSEMISVALIOKUNNAN KOOSTUMUS JA TOIMITUSJOHTAJAN 
PALKITSEMINEN – SUOMALAINEN AINEISTO 
 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia palkitsemisvaliokunnan koostumuksen vaikutusta 
toimitusjohtajan palkitsemisen tasoon. Palkitsemisvaliokunnan koostumusta on 
analysoitu käyttämällä viittä muuttujaa, jotka ovat: 1) ei-riippumattomien hallituksen 
jäsenten osuus, 2) pitkään palvelleiden hallituksen jäsenten osuus, 3) hallituksen 
toimitusjohtajajäsenten osuus, 4) kiireisten hallituksen jäsenten osuus sekä 5) 
merkittävän osakkeenomistajan läsnäolo palkitsemisvaliokunnassa. Toimitusjohtajan 
palkitsemista mitataan kolmella instrumentilla, jotka ovat peruspalkka, 
käteispalkitseminen sekä kokonaispalkitseminen. 
 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
 
Lähdeaineisto koostuu yrityksistä, jotka olivat listattuna NASDAQ OMX Helsingissä 
syyskuussa vuonna 2011 ja jotka käyttivät palkitsemisvaliokuntaa sisäisessä 
hallinnossaan jossakin vaiheessa vuosien 2006 ja 2009 välillä. Tarvittavien 
eliminointien jälkeen lopullinen otos koostuu 177:stä yritysvuosihavainnosta. Kaikki 
riippumattomat muuttujat ovat vuosilta 2006-2009, kun taas riippuvainen muuttuja on 
vuosilta 2007-2010. 
 
 
TULOKSET 
 
Tulokset osoittavat, että ei-riippumattomien hallituksen jäsenten osuudella on 
tilastollisesti erittäin merkitsevä negatiivinen vaikutus toimitusjohtajan peruspalkkaan 
sekä käteispalkitsemiseen. Pitkään palvelleiden hallituksen jäsenten osuudella on 
tilastollisesti merkitsevä negatiivinen vaikutus toimitusjohtajan käteispalkitsemiseen 
sekä erityisesti kokonaispalkitsemiseen. Lopuksi, kiireisten hallituksen jäsenten 
osuudella on tilastollisesti merkitsevä negatiivinen yhteys toimitusjohtajan 
peruspalkkaan. Hallituksen toimitusjohtajajäsenten osuudella sekä merkittävän 
osakkeenomistajan läsnäololla palkitsemisvaliokunnassa ei ole tilastollisesti 
merkitsevää yhteyttä toimitusjohtajan palkitsemiseen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Academic and practical motivation 
 
The subject of executive compensation generates significant interest among the people and 
the media. High rewards enjoyed by the top executives are, time after time, discussed in the 
media. For example, in 2006 the earnings of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the energy 
company Fortum were over 11 million euros (Taloussanomat 1.11.2007), which triggered 
considerable critique both in the media and amongst the masses. More recently Finnair paid 
its senior executives approximately 2,7 million euros of “loyalty” bonuses in 2011 for staying 
in the company during the CEO transition period (YLE Uutiset 7.3.2012). The arrangement 
was put into effect in 2009, at the same time when the company was cutting personnel costs 
(Helsingin Sanomat 28.3.2012). When the arrangement finally came to light in March 2012 it 
caused public outcry and was criticized even at the minister level. As an outcome of the crisis 
the majority of the board members of Finnair were dismissed (Helsingin Sanomat 21.3.2012). 
From the discussion above it can be seen that executive compensation spawns strong 
reactions among the general public which can, if taken to the extreme, result in dismissals on 
the highest level of the company. 
 
Executive compensation has also received a great deal of attention within the academic 
circles. As a testimony of this, there are roughly speaking hundreds of studies investigating 
the different aspects of executive compensation. However, among the academics the object of 
interest is usually not whether the compensation, as such, is too high or not. Instead, the 
academics typically aim to identify the factors affecting the level and/or structure of executive 
compensation.  
 
Executive compensation has a salient function in the internal governance of the company. 
First, by using appropriate compensation the executives can be motivated to work harder and 
take actions that are in the interests of the shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990). Second, executive compensation is a key to retain and attract 
talented executives (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Conyon 2006). Third, proper 
remuneration reinforces the implementation of the company strategy and goals (e.g. the 
Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2010). Based on the reasoning above, it is easy to 
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understand the significance of executive compensation in the internal governance of the 
company.  
 
The task of designing and preparing the remuneration of executives usually belongs to the 
compensation committee (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Bender and Porter 2003). In this 
sense, it is of the essence and intriguing to examine how the structure of this organ affects 
CEO compensation. In the compensation literature there exist several studies about the effect 
of compensation committee structure on CEO compensation. For example Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand and Dalton (1998), Newman and Mozes (1999), Vafeas (2003a) and Conyon and He 
(2004) have investigated this relationship.  
 
The findings of the earlier papers exploring the connection between compensation committee 
composition and CEO compensation vary considerably. Anderson and Bizjak (2003), for 
instance, discovered that the fraction of outsiders on the compensation committee had no 
effect on the level of CEO compensation. Conyon and Peck (1998), on the other hand, 
detected that a higher percentage of outsiders on the compensation committee, in fact, 
increased the amount of CEO compensation. In relation to CEO-directors, Conyon and He 
(2004) found that the proportion of CEOs of other companies on the compensation committee 
had no effect on the level of CEO compensation, while Sapp (2008) identified it to increase 
the level of CEO compensation. These examples reflect the general situation in compensation 
committee study. There is no consensus about the effects of the different components of 
compensation committee composition on CEO compensation. Consequently, casting 
additional light on this ambiguous subject is essential.  
 
The majority of existing studies about the relationship between compensation committee 
composition and CEO compensation have been conducted with U.S. data. For example, 
Conyon and He (2004), Newman and Mozes (1999) and Vafeas (2003) have investigated this 
relationship with U.S. data. In addition there exist some papers performed with U.K. 
companies (e.g. Conyon and Peck 1998). Finally, I discovered investigations about the 
association between compensation committee composition and CEO compensation, 
conducted with Australian data (Capezio, Shields and O’Donnell 2011), Canadian data (Sapp 
2008) and New Zealand data (Boyle and Roberts 2010). However, I’m not aware of any study 
completed with Finnish data that focuses exclusively on the compensation committees and 
examines, in depth, the impact of compensation committee composition on CEO 
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compensation. As a result, an investigation about this relationship in Finland, where also the 
corporate governance landscape is different from the above-mentioned countries (e.g. higher 
ownership concentration and less active external market for corporate control), would 
contribute substantially to compensation committee literature.  
 
1.2. Research problem and purpose 
 
The research problem of this thesis is how compensation committee composition affects the 
level of CEO compensation. To analyze the composition of a compensation committee, I 
employ five commonly used variables which are: 1) the proportion of non-independent 
directors, 2) the proportion of long-serving directors 3) the proportion of CEO-directors, 4) 
the proportion of busy directors, and 5) the presence of a blockholder on the compensation 
committee. 
 
In order to measure the level of CEO compensation, I use three instruments which are: 1) base 
salary, 2) cash compensation and 3) total compensation. First, base salary consists of regular 
salary and perquisites. Second, cash compensation instrument includes base salary, 
perquisites and bonuses. Third, total compensation is comprised of base salary, perquisites, 
bonuses, stock options, performance shares and other long term incentive plans (LTIPs). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to present Finnish evidence about the association between 
compensation committee composition and the level of CEO compensation. More specifically, 
I aim at providing evidence of the effect of non-independent directors, long-serving directors, 
CEO-directors, busy directors and the presence of a blockholder on the compensation 
committee on the level of different CEO compensation measures. 
 
1.3. Contribution 
 
First, the results of the studies investigating the relationship between compensation committee 
composition and CEO compensation vary considerably, as turned out already in Section 1. In 
this light it can be seen how this research contributes to the existing literature, by providing 
new evidence on this controversial subject.  
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Second, the papers exploring the relationship between compensation committee composition 
and CEO compensation are mainly conducted with U.S. and U.K. data, as discussed earlier in 
Section 1.  In particular, I’m not aware of any study performed with Finnish data that studies 
this relationship thoroughly. In this sense, this research contributes to compensation 
committee literature by providing novel evidence from Finland, where also the corporate 
governance landscape is different. 
 
1.4. Limitations of the study 
 
This thesis has certain limitations as is customary in comparable studies. First of all, the 
measure of total CEO compensation does not include pension plans. According to the 
managerial power theory, the managers have an incentive to camouflage their extraction of 
rents. One way to execute this is through pension plans, because the companies are not 
required to report a dollar value of the pensions of their executives (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
Additionally, the significance of pension-benefits in total compensation of the CEO has been 
stressed, for example, by Ikäheimo, Kontu, Kostiander, Tainio and Uusitalo (2007) in their 
report and by the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2010 (Recommendation 46). In this 
sense, it would have been important to include the value of pensions in total CEO 
compensation. However, in Finland the companies are not required to report the sum of the 
pensions of the CEO and accordingly, the information about pensions is mainly scarce and 
insufficient. As a consequence I have excluded pension plans from the analysis.  
 
Secondly, this study focuses to investigate the effect of compensation committee composition 
on the level of CEO compensation. However, it is well-known that it is not only the level of 
compensation that matters, but also the structure of compensation. In other words, the mix 
between, for example, fixed and variable remuneration is an important factor when analyzing 
the suitability of the compensation arrangement. However, the linear regression model does 
not function properly if the dependent variable is a proportion, and especially so if the 
proportions are concentrated at zero or one (as is the case with this data set), as explained by 
Grace-Martin (2012). For this reason and because I wish to keep this study concise, I have not 
included the structure of CEO compensation in the analysis.  
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Finally, it is important to clarify (even though it is not a limitation as such) that the objective 
of this study is not to analyze if CEO compensation is on the appropriate level or not. 
Similarly, my intention is neither to criticize nor to praise the remuneration of the CEOs. 
Instead the plain objective of this thesis is to investigate how the composition of the 
compensation committee affects the level of CEO compensation.  
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
 
The thesis is structured in the following fashion. In Chapter 2, I explain the role of the 
compensation committee in the internal governance of the company. In Chapter 3, two well-
known theories about executive compensation are discussed. Chapter 4 presents relevant 
literature concerning the relationship between compensation committee composition and CEO 
compensation. In Chapter 5, I introduce the hypotheses. Chapter 6 goes through the data and 
methods employed in this thesis. In Chapter 7, the results are presented and discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes. 
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2. ROLE AND DUTIES OF COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
 
In this chapter, I describe the role and duties of the compensation committee in the internal 
governance of the company. I start by explaining the responsibilities of the board of directors 
in Section 1. In Section 2, I discuss the function of the board committees generally. Finally, in 
Section 3, I describe the role and duties of the compensation committee. 
 
2.1. Board of directors 
 
The board of directors is the heart of the internal control systems in organizations (e.g. Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). The prime responsibilities of the board of directors are to 
employ, evaluate, compensate and discharge top executives (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Jensen 1993; Lorsch and MacIver 1989). The board of directors also monitors and ratifies 
significant decisions of the company (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). In addition to 
the control role, the board is expected to provide advising and counseling for the management 
(e.g. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 1996; Mace 1971) and in some cases to give a hand in 
setting the company strategy (e.g. Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2008; Johnson, Daily and 
Ellstrand 1996). 
 
2.2. Board committees 
 
The Finnish Corporate Governance Codes encourage the companies to establish board 
committees. More specifically they state that the companies can improve the efficiency of 
their board work by establishing board committees. In the board committees the directors can 
focus more thoroughly on the issues allocated to the committee than the entire board. 
 
As stated in the Finnish Corporate Governance Codes, the board of directors selects board 
committee members among its own members. The function of the board committees is to 
assist the board by preparing matters the board is responsible for. The board committees, 
however, have no autonomous decision-making power but instead the board makes the 
decisions as a whole. In the Finnish listed companies the most typical board committees are 
the audit committee, the compensation committee and the nomination committee. In this 
thesis the interest is targeted to the compensation committees, which I discuss next. 
7 
 
2.3. Compensation committee 
 
The task of designing and setting executive compensation is usually passed on to the 
compensation committee (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Conyon and He 2004; Conyon 
2006). In order to fulfill this duty the compensation committee must establish a compensation 
policy compatible with the firm’s strategy that helps the committee to construct compensation 
packages that match the objectives of the shareholders, the managers and the regulators 
(Bender and Porter, 2003). The board as a whole finally ratifies the propositions of the 
compensation committee (e.g. Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). 
 
The importance of the compensation committee is also reflected in the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Codes. More specifically, the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2010 includes 
three recommendations concerning the compensation committees. These recommendations 
are presented below. (Note: In the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2010 the term 
remuneration committee is applied instead of compensation committee and the term 
managing director instead of chief executive officer).  
 
 
Recommendation 31 - Establishment of the remuneration committee  
 
“The board may establish a remuneration committee to improve the efficient preparation of 
matters pertaining to the appointment and remuneration of the managing director and other 
executives of the company as well as the remuneration schemes of the personnel.”  
 
 
Recommendation 32 - Members of the remuneration committee  
 
“The majority of the members of the remuneration committee shall be independent of the 
company. The managing director or other executives of the company may not be appointed to 
the remuneration committee.”  
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Recommendation 33 - Duties of the remuneration committee  
 
“The board shall define the duties of the remuneration committee in the charter of the 
committee.  
The duties of the remuneration committee may include, e.g.:  
• preparation of matters pertaining to the appointment of the managing director and the other 
executives as well as the identification of their possible successors  
• preparation of matters pertaining to the remuneration and other financial benefits of the 
managing director and other executives  
• preparation of matters pertaining to the remuneration schemes of the company  
• evaluation of the remuneration of the managing director and the other executives as well as 
seeing to it that the remuneration schemes are appropriate  
• answering questions related to the remuneration statement at the general meeting.”  
 
 
The recommendations above highlight three important characteristics of the compensation 
committee. First, the establishment of the compensation committee is optional. Second, the 
independence of the compensation committee is of high importance, in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest. Third, the duties of the compensation committee include, in addition to 
the preparation and evaluation of the remuneration, the preparation of the appointment of the 
CEO and other executives and also the search for the suitable candidates for these positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
3. MAIN THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
This chapter presents the basics of the two theories that are typically referred to in papers 
dealing with executive compensation. These theories are the agency theory, which is 
discussed in Section 1 and the managerial power theory, which is explained in Section 2. 
 
3.1. Agency theory  
 
The separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between the agents 
and the principals, as stated by Fama and Jensen (1983). To be exact, by the separation of 
ownership and control Fama and Jensen meant the separation of decision management and 
residual risk bearing. The problem in this setting is that the decision agents carry only a minor 
portion of the wealth effects of their actions (Fama and Jensen 1983). In order to control 
resulting agency problems, corporations separate decision management from decision control 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). The core of this decision control system in organizations is the 
board of directors which has the authority to appoint, compensate, dismiss and monitor the 
executives and ratify their proposals (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993).  
 
The core of the agency theory is establishing the most effective contract to rule the 
relationship between the agent and the principal under certain assumptions like the conflict of 
interest between the agent and the principal, self-interest of both parties and managerial risk 
aversion (Eisenhardt 1989).  An agency relationship then, is a contract under which the 
principals hire the agent to work for them, equipped with necessary decision making power, 
as stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). An example of such agency relationship is the 
corporation with dispersed ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the agency 
relationship where both the principals and the agents are utility maximizers and differ in their 
risk appetite, the actions of the agents are likely to differ from what would be optimal for the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
In this case, a specific contract defining the actions and decisions conducted by the CEO in 
each state of affairs, would be a viable solution (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, as 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out, entering into such a complete contract would be 
unfeasible because the investment opportunities of the company and the actions of the CEO 
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are typically unnoticeable for the shareholders. Additionally, because the CEOs possess 
specific information about the company and its prospects it would be unreasonable to expect 
that the shareholders could tell the CEO which projects to take on and which decisions to 
make (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In addition, the possibilities and incentives of the diffuse 
shareholders to contract with the CEO are further undermined by a free-rider problem 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). 
 
As an answer to this conflict of interest, the principals can offer the agents incentives to 
pursue shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Murphy 1990). Examples 
of such incentives are performance based bonuses, salary adjustments and stock options, as 
stated by Jensen and Murphy (1990). Other mechanisms to alleviate these agency problems, 
in addition to incentive compensation, are monitoring of managers’ actions and bonding by 
the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). By tying the wealth of the CEO to the wealth of the 
shareholders, the CEOs can be persuaded to take actions in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Therefore from the agency theory perspective 
executive compensation can be seen as an efficient tool to reduce agency costs and thus 
mitigate the inherent problems with the agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990).  
 
The use of incentive based compensation to overcome agency problems is not, however, a 
totally trouble-free solution because of the managerial risk aversion (Beatty and Zajac 1994).  
Accordingly, risk-averse CEOs who have already invested their human capital in the 
company would be unwilling to tie their remuneration to the company’s success (Beatty and 
Zajac 1994). As a consequence, the companies have to pay their CEOs more to compensate 
them for the higher risk (Beatty and Zajac 1994). In the same spirit Holmström (1999) points 
out that by tying the compensation of the agent to output like stock price, the agent is also 
exposed to factors that are not under his control, and as a consequence the contract is made 
riskier. Thus, there is a trade-off between creating efficient managerial incentives and risk-
sharing, which must be taken into account when establishing optimal compensation packages 
(e.g. Beatty and Zajac 1994; Holmström 1999; Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
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3.2. Managerial power theory 
 
Jensen (1993) stated that the boards of directors have failed in their task of monitoring 
shareholder interests. This failure can be attributed, at least, to the atmosphere of politeness in 
boardrooms, the CEO’s dominance of the company specific information and the lack of 
equity ownership by both directors and managers (Jensen 1993). As a consequence, CEOs are 
able to gain control over the boards (Jensen 1993). Other factors that compromise the 
integrity of the boards of directors, according to Jensen (1993), are a large board size, insider 
board members, CEO duality (CEO being also the chairman of the board) and the absence of 
institutional owners. 
 
Allen (1981) suggested that the managers typically use their organizational power to shield 
and advance their own privileges. According to Allen, the prime source of managerial power 
is a substantial equity stake in the company. Consequently, the CEO is more powerful if he 
owns a substantial block of the shares of the company and less powerful if the board members 
have blockholdings (Allen 1981). Allen further stated that CEOs use their power to extract 
higher compensation and as a consequence, CEO compensation is directly linked to his power 
in a company. 
 
Zald (1969) approached the subject of managerial power by reviewing the power of the 
boards in relation to the managers, and reached similar conclusions as Allen (1981). 
According to Zald, the power of the boards of directors depends positively on the external 
resources they control. In other words, the boards of directors are more powerful the more 
resources (e.g. shares of the company and detailed knowledge of the company) they have 
under their control (Zald 1969). As a consequence, in a highly complex organization with a 
highly dispersed ownership structure, the CEO controls the information, the agendas for board 
meetings, the nominating processes and internal board processes altogether (Zald 1969).   
 
In a similar vein Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) stated that CEO compensation in the 
management controlled companies is less tightly tied to performance than in the owner 
controlled companies. The reason for this is that the executives in the management controlled 
companies have achieved a greater control over the internal decision mechanisms and 
processes and thus can influence their own compensation contracts (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 
1989). 
12 
 
According to Mace (1971), the boards of directors and their subcommittees are mainly 
symbols of the internal control mechanisms, when in reality the CEO makes the decisions 
concerning, for example, his own compensation and director selection. Loyalties that directors 
feel towards the CEO who selected them and with whom they work with, constrain their 
ability to critically evaluate, question or discharge the CEO (Mace 1971). Finally, Mace 
(1971) argued that the ultimate power enjoyed by the CEO allows him to set the agendas for  
board meetings. 
 
These ideas and assumptions of the managerial power are bunched together, shaped and 
advanced in the managerial power theory by Bebchuk, Fried and Walker in 2002. Under the 
managerial power theory executive compensation is not seen only as a solution to the agency 
problem, but also as a part of the agency problem itself (e.g. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 
2002; Bebchuk and Fried 2003). According to the managerial power theory, the managers 
have substantial influence over the boards of directors and as a result over their own 
compensation, as stated by Bebchuk et al. (2002 and 2003). As a consequence, the boards of 
directors do not design executive compensation packages at arm’s length but rather these 
compensation packages are biased towards the managers’ wishes and thus, are far from 
optimal (Bebchuk et al. 2002 and 2003)  
 
The assumption under the managerial power theory is that the more power the CEO has the 
more rents he also extracts (Bebchuk et al. 2002 and 2003). The power of the CEO again 
depends on the composition of the board of directors, the presence of large shareholders, the 
stockholdings of the CEO, the proportion of shares held by institutional investors and the use 
of antitakeover arrangements (Bebchuk et al. 2002 and 2003). Accordingly, a weaker board, 
the absence of large shareholders, higher CEO stockholdings, lower institutional 
stockholdings and the use of antitakeover arrangements are all associated with managers 
having more power (Bebchuk et al. 2002 and 2003). 
 
In a nutshell, the main difference between these two theories is that under the agency theory 
executive compensation is regarded as a solution to the agency problems between the agents 
and the shareholders, whereas under the managerial power theory executive compensation is 
considered as a part of that agency problem.  
 
 
13 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, I review literature relevant to this study. The chapter is divided in two 
sections. In Section 1, I extensively examine the literature which studies the effect of 
compensation committee composition on CEO compensation. In Section 2, I briefly discuss 
literature concerning the relationship between the board of directors and CEO compensation. 
   
4.1. Compensation committee and CEO compensation 
 
The literature about the relationship between compensation committee composition and CEO 
compensation is, in fact, quite abundant reaching from New Zealand to the U.S. The findings, 
however, vary considerably. Some papers discover, for example, that higher compensation 
committee independence results in lower CEO compensation and/or higher pay-performance 
sensitivity, while some studies cannot find such a relationship and some even uncover 
opposite results.  
 
Table 1 below provides basic information about the studies investigating compensation 
committees and their effect on CEO compensation. Here I discuss the findings of these 
studies more thoroughly, by starting with the papers that have explored the impact of 
compensation committee existence on CEO compensation. 
 
In the first place, Conyon (1997) provided weak evidence that the introduction of the 
remuneration committee improved top director compensation practices. Specifically, the 
results indicated that the adoption of the remuneration committee resulted in a lower growth 
pace in top director pay, although this result was not robust when using a balanced data set. 
Further, the evidence indicated that the introduction of the remuneration committee was 
unrelated to pay-performance sensitivity.  
 
Main and Johnston (1993) and Conyon and Peck (1998) however, could not discover 
evidence supporting the idea that the remuneration committees design compensation packages 
that pursue shareholder interests. Instead their empirical findings indicated that the existence 
of the remuneration committee, actually, increased the level of compensation of the highest 
paid director. Furthermore, Main and Johnston (1993) could not find a statistically significant 
link between remuneration committee existence and pay-performance sensitivity. 
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Table 1. Studies investigating compensation committees and their effect on CEO 
compensation 
This Table presents basic information about the studies investigating compensation committees and their 
effect on CEO compensation. Basic information includes the authors, the sample, the main issues examined 
and the key findings. 
Study Sample 
Compensation committee 
characteristics examined 
Key findings relating to 
compensation committees 
O’Reilly, Main 
and Crystal (1988) 
105 U.S. companies 
from Fortune 500  in 
1984 
Effect of outsider 
compensation committee 
members' salaries in their 
own companies on CEO 
compensation 
Higher salaries of outsider 
compensation committee 
members in their own 
companies were associated 
with higher CEO compensation  
Main and 
Johnston (1993)  
220 large public U.K. 
companies in 1990 
Effect of remuneration 
committee existence on 
highest paid director 
compensation 
Existence of remuneration 
committee  increased the level 
of highest paid director 
compensation but had no effect 
on pay-performance 
relationship 
Conyon (1997)  213 large U.K. public 
companies between 
1988 and 1993 
Effect of remuneration 
committee introduction on 
highest paid director 
compensation 
Introduction of remuneration 
committee resulted in lower 
growth pace in top director 
pay, but had no effect on pay-
performance sensitivity   
Conyon and Peck 
(1998)  
94 U.K. companies 
from FTSE 100 Index 
during the period 1991-
1994 
1) Effect of remuneration 
committee existence on CEO 
compensation                                                
2) Effect of outsider 
remuneration committee 
members' percentage on 
CEO compensation  
1) Remuneration committee 
existence increased the level of 
CEO compensation.                                    
2) Higher percentage of 
outsiders on remuneration 
committee had a positive effect 
both on the level and pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation 
Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand and 
Dalton (1998) 
200 U.S. companies 
from Fortune 500 over 
the period of 1991-1994 
Effect of affiliated, CEO, 
and interdependent 
compensation committee 
members' proportion on 
CEO compensation 
None of the variables 
measuring proportion of 
affiliated, interdependent, or 
CEO-directors on 
compensation committee, had 
any effect on CEO 
compensation, whether 
measured by the level, 
structure or change of CEO 
compensation 
Newman and 
Mozes (1999)  
161 U.S. companies 
from Fortune 250 in 
1992 
Influence of insider presence 
on compensation committee 
on CEO compensation 
Insider presence on 
compensation committee 
resulted in weaker relationship 
between negative company 
performance and CEO 
compensation, but had no 
influence on the level of CEO 
compensation 
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Table 1. Continued 
Study Sample 
Compensation committee 
characteristics examined 
Key findings relating to 
compensation committees 
Anderson and 
Bizjak (2003)  
110 U.S. Public 
companies between 
1985 and 1998 
1) Effect of outsider  
compensation committee 
members' proportion on 
CEO compensation                            
2)Effect of CEO's presence 
on his own compensation 
committee on CEO 
compensation 
1) Proportion of outsider had 
no effect on CEO 
compensation                                  
2) Presence of  CEO on his 
own compensation committee, 
was not associated with higher 
level of compensation or lower 
equity incentives                           
Vafeas (2003)  271 large public U.S. 
companies between 
1991 and 1997 
1) Effect of insider presence 
on compensation committee 
on CEO compensation                           
2)Effect of compensation 
disclosure and tax reforms 
on compensation committees 
and CEO compensation 
1) Insider presence on 
compensation committee had 
no effect on the level or pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation.                                
2) Before the reforms  insider 
presence on compensation 
committee was associated with 
lower pay-performance 
sensitivity 
Conyon and He 
(2004)  
455 U.S. companies 
that carried out an IPO 
in 1999 
1)Effect of  insider, CEO and 
diversified compensation 
committee members' 
proportion, on CEO 
compensation                           
2) Effect of compensation 
committee members' fees on 
CEO compensation                             
3) Effect of large 
shareholder's presence on 
compensation committee on 
CEO compensation  
1) Proportion of insider, CEO, 
or diversified directors on 
compensation committee had 
no effect on CEO 
compensation                                 
2) Higher compensation 
committee members' fees were 
coupled with higher level of 
CEO compensation and lower 
equity incentives                                 
3) Presence of large 
shareholder on compensation 
committee resulted in lower 
level of CEO compensation 
and higher equity incentives 
Sapp (2008)  416 Canadian public 
companies between 
2000 and 2005 
Effect of  independent, CEO, 
and financially sophisticated 
compensation committee 
members' percentage on 
CEO compensation 
1) Higher percentage of both 
independent and CEO-directors 
on compensation committee 
increased the level and pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation                        
2) Percentage of compensation 
committee members with 
financial expertise had no 
effect on CEO compensation 
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Table 1. Continued 
Study Sample 
Compensation committee 
characteristics examined 
Key findings relating to 
compensation committees 
Sun and Cahan 
(2009)  
812 U.S. public 
companies in 2001 
Impact of compensation 
committee quality on CEO 
compensation, when quality 
is measured through 
committee size and 
shareholdings, and 
proportion of CEO, busy, 
“CEO appointed” and long-
serving directors on 
compensation committee 
Higher compensation 
committee quality was 
associated with higher pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation 
Sun, Cahan and 
Emanuel (2009)  
474 U.S. public 
companies during   
2001 - 2004 
Impact of compensation 
committee quality on CEO 
compensation, when quality 
is measured through 
committee size and 
shareholdings, and 
proportion of CEO, busy, 
“CEO appointed” and long-
serving directors on 
compensation committee 
Higher compensation 
committee quality was 
associated with higher pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation. 
Boyle and Roberts 
(2010)  
114 companies on New 
Zealand Stock 
Exchange between 
1997 and 2005 
Effect of CEO's presence on 
his own compensation 
committee on CEO 
compensation 
Presence of CEO on his own 
compensation committee was 
associated with lower pay-
performance relationship and 
more generous annual pay 
increments  
Capezio, Shields 
and O’Donnell 
(2011)  
663 Australian public 
companies during   
1998 - 2006. 
Effect of non-executive 
compensation committee 
members' proportion on 
CEO compensation 
Proportion of non-executive 
compensation committee 
members had no effect on  pay-
performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation 
Hoitash (2011)  13 000 directors on 
U.S. companies during 
2004 - 2005 
Impact of social ties between 
managers and independent 
compensation committee 
members on CEO 
compensation 
Social ties between managers 
and independent compensation 
committee members were 
associated with higher CEO 
compensation 
 
 
 
Next I go through the findings of the papers that have examined the effect of the CEO’s 
presence on his own compensation committee on CEO compensation. To begin with, Boyle 
and Roberts (2010) found that CEO compensation packages are more favorable towards the 
CEO when the CEO is a member of his own compensation committee. In more detail, their 
results indicated that CEO compensation is less sensitive to accounting performance in the 
companies where the CEO is a member of his own compensation committee compared to the 
companies where the CEO is not even a board member. Additionally, in a case of negative 
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performance, the companies with the CEO on the compensation committee had lower pay-
performance sensitivity, while the companies with the non-board CEO had higher pay-
performance sensitivity. Finally, they discovered that subsequent performance was inferior in 
the companies where the growth in pay was due to the CEO’s presence on his own 
compensation committee. Altogether, Boyle and Roberts came to a conclusion that CEO 
participation in the mechanisms setting executive compensation benefitted the CEO at the 
expense of the shareholders.  
 
Nevertheless, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) could not uncover evidence of opportunistic 
behavior by the CEOs who sit on their own compensation committee. To be more precise, 
their evidence indicated that the presence of the CEO on his own compensation committee 
was not associated with a higher level of compensation or lower equity incentives, but rather 
the other way around. In addition, their results denoted that the CEO’s exit from the 
compensation committee was not associated with lower CEO compensation or higher equity 
incentives.  
 
The majority of the compensation committee studies have explored the association between 
compensation committee independence and CEO compensation. The measure of 
independence, however, has varied considerably. Below I discuss the findings of these papers. 
 
First of all, Hoitash (2011) found that social ties between managers and independent 
compensation committee members resulted in more favorable compensation packages for the 
CEOs. By a social tie Hoitash referred to a situation where the manager and the independent 
director served together on another company’s board.  To be precise, his results revealed that 
social ties between managers and independent compensation committee members were 
associated with statistically significantly higher CEO salary and total cash compensation. 
Based upon this finding, Hoitash recommended the independent directors with social ties to 
management to step aside from the compensation committees.  
 
Newman and Mozes (1999) discovered that insider presence on the compensation committee 
resulted in compensation practices that were, to some degree, tilted in the management’s 
favor. In more detail, their results indicated that the relationship between negative company 
performance and CEO compensation was weaker in the insider influenced firms than in the 
outsider influenced firms. Furthermore, their evidence suggested that this weaker link was 
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explained by the insider influenced firms granting new stock options to the CEO after the 
value of their pre-existing stock options had dropped due to negative company performance. 
According to Newman and Mozes, this practice was evidence of managerial self-dealing. 
Finally, they found, however, that the presence of insiders on the compensation committee 
had no effect on the level of CEO compensation, a result that was not in the spirit of their 
other findings.  
 
Similarly, Vafeas (2003a) discovered some evidence of opportunistic behavior by insider 
directors. More specifically, his result indicated that in 1991, before the compensation 
disclosure and tax reforms in the U.S. took place, insider membership on the compensation 
committee was associated with a higher non-contingent pay and a lower contingent pay. 
However, the findings regarding the whole period (1991-1997), indicated that the existence of 
insiders on the compensation committee had no influence on the level or the pay-performance 
link of CEO compensation. 
 
Conyon and Peck (1998) provided mixed evidence about the importance of outsider directors 
in designing effective executive compensation packages. In more detail, their results 
suggested that a higher proportion of outsiders on the remuneration committee, in fact, 
increased the level of CEO compensation. Additionally, their findings indicated, however, 
that the pay-performance relationship was stronger in the companies where the proportion of 
outsiders on the remuneration committee was higher. Thus Conyon and Peck’s results are 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand a higher proportion of outsiders on the remuneration 
committee increased the level of CEO compensation and, on the other hand, a higher 
proportion of outsiders on the remuneration committee strengthened the pay-performance 
link.  
 
In contrast, Capezio, Shields and O’Donnell (2011) found that CEO pay is not more tightly 
linked to performance in non-executive dominated compensation committees. More 
specifically, their results indicated that the percentage of non-executives on the compensation 
committee was unrelated to the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO. In addition, they 
discovered that non-incentive cash compensation of the CEO was positively related to the 
percentage of non-executives on the compensation committee.  
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The findings of Anderson and Bizjak (2003), however, indicated that compensation 
committee independence and CEO compensation had no statistical association. In more detail, 
they found that the fraction of outsiders on the compensation committee had no effect on the 
level or pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.  
 
Instead of focusing solely on independence, there are several studies that have analyzed 
compensation committee composition more extensively by applying various characteristics. 
These include, for instance, the proportion of CEO-directors (i.e. the directors who are the 
CEOs of other companies) and the presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee. 
The results of these investigations are discussed below.  
 
In the first place, Sapp (2008) presented non-uniform evidence about the effectiveness of the 
independent directors, CEO-directors and directors with financial expertise. More precisely, 
his findings indicated that a higher percentage of both independent directors and CEO-
directors on the compensation committee increased both the level and the pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO compensation. Additionally, his results indicated that a percentage of 
compensation committee members with financial expertise had no statistically significant 
effect on CEO compensation. To sum up, Sapp’s study provided mixed evidence about the 
usefulness of independent directors and the harmfulness of CEO-directors. 
 
The findings of Conyon and He (2004) indicated that the compensation committee members’ 
fees and the presence of a large shareholder on the committee were significant factors in CEO 
compensation, whereas the proportion of insider directors, CEO-directors and diversified 
directors were statistically insignificant. Specifically, they discovered that higher fees of the 
compensation committee members were coupled with higher CEO compensation and lower 
equity incentives. Additionally, they found that the attendance of a large shareholder (equity 
stake ≥ 5%) on the compensation committee resulted in lower CEO compensation and higher 
incentives. Together these findings supported the conception of self-interested compensation 
committee members, as stated by Conyon et al. (2004). Finally, their results indicated that the 
proportion of insider directors, CEO-directors and diversified directors on the compensation 
committee had no effect on the level or structure of CEO compensation.  
 
Correspondingly, Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) found that a higher proportion 
of affiliated, interdependent or CEO-directors on the compensation committee did not result 
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in more favorable compensation arrangements for the CEOs. More specifically, their findings 
indicated that the proportion of affiliated, interdependent and CEO-directors had no effect on 
the level, structure or change of CEO compensation. By affiliated directors they denoted non-
management directors who had personal and/or professional ties with a company or its 
management. By interdependent directors they denoted non-management directors who were 
hired during the tenure of the CEO.  
 
Sun and Cahan (2009a) and Sun, Cahan and Emanuel (2009b) discovered that higher 
compensation committee quality resulted in higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO 
compensation. More specifically, the findings of Sun et al. (2009a) indicated that higher 
compensation committee quality resulted in a stronger relationship between CEO cash 
compensation and accounting performance. In addition, they observed that this effect was 
weaker for the high growth companies and the loss-making companies. The results of Sun et 
al. (2009b) denoted that higher compensation committee quality was associated with a greater 
positive link between CEO stock option grants and future firm performance. Based on these 
findings Sun et al. (2009b) concluded that higher quality compensation committees structure 
more effective compensation contracts. In order to measure compensation committee quality, 
both studies employed the same six metrics, which were the compensation committee size, 
the aggregate shareholdings of the committee members and the fraction of CEO-directors, 
busy directors, “CEO appointed directors” and long-serving directors on the compensation 
committee. 
 
Finally, O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) discovered that the social comparison model had 
an impact on the pay determination of the CEO. More specifically, their results indicated that 
higher salaries of outsider compensation committee members at their own companies were 
associated with higher CEO compensation, thus supporting the idea of the social comparison.  
 
In summary, it can be said that the findings of the earlier compensation committee studies 
differ substantially. For that reason, additional evidence on this ambiguous subject is of high 
importance.       
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4.2. Boards and CEO compensation 
 
In this section I review, in brief, studies that have investigated the association between board 
structure and CEO compensation. It is not my intention to discuss all the research done in this 
field because this literature is substantial, but rather to give some idea of the research 
conducted on this area because it is closely related to my real subject of interest i.e. the 
compensation committees. The studies are discussed in a chronological order. 
 
In the first place, Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) examined the determinants of CEO 
compensation and discovered that the fraction of both outside directors and “CEO appointed” 
outside directors on the board resulted in higher CEO pay. In addition, they discovered that 
CEO stockholdings and the existence of an external blockholder were negatively associated 
with CEO compensation. 
 
Boyd (1994) explored the relationship between board control and CEO compensation and 
found that a greater board control was associated with lower CEO compensation. To be 
specific, his evidence pointed out that CEO duality and director pay had an adverse effect on 
board control and, consequently, led to a higher level of CEO compensation. In addition, he 
discovered that board stock ownership, the presence of institutional owners on the board and, 
surprisingly, the insider board membership had a positive impact on board control and, 
accordingly, a negative relationship with CEO compensation.  
 
Yermack (1996) analyzed the efficiency of small boards and discovered that a small board 
size was associated with higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. Hallock 
(1997) on the other hand, investigated the effect of interlocked boards on CEO remuneration 
and found that the interlocked boards (excluding interlocks based on business relationships) 
increased CEO remuneration consisting of salary, bonus and other compensation about 17%.  
 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1998) examined the impact of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation and discovered that weaker governance structures were associated with higher 
CEO compensation. These weaker governance structures were characterized by a higher 
percentage of busy directors, old directors, “gray” directors, and “CEO appointed” directors. 
Additionally, CEO duality, large board size, low CEO equity stake and the absence of 
blockholder directors were features of weaker governance structures. 
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Talmor and Wallace (2001) studied CEO compensation in the financial services sector and 
found board strength, measured by independence and effectiveness, to have a negative 
relationship with both the level and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.  
 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) studied the role of luck in CEO compensation and found 
that the companies compensated their CEOs for luck as much as for general performance. In 
addition, they discovered, however, that this relationship between luck and CEO 
compensation was weaker in the companies that had large shareholders sitting on the board.  
 
Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) examined the effect of board structure on CEO compensation 
and discovered that the board shareholdings were associated with lower CEO equity 
compensation. Furthermore, their results indicated that both CEO duality and the proportion 
of outsiders increased CEO compensation.  
 
Cahan, Chua and Nyamori (2005) investigated the effects of board structure on CEO 
compensation in the public sector. Their findings suggested that board size and the CEO’s 
board membership were positively related to the level of CEO compensation. Director 
reputation, then again, reduced CEO compensation. Finally, however, they discovered that the 
proportion of insider, grey and busy directors had no influence on CEO compensation.  
 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) explored the impact of the new corporate governance 
requirements by NYSE and NASDAQ in 2002 on CEO compensation. Their evidence 
indicated that the companies least in line with these new regulations reduced most their CEO 
compensation subsequently. Specifically, they identified that the companies that did not fulfill 
the requirement of the board consisting of the majority of independent directors cut the 
compensation of their CEOs by 17% more compared to the companies that satisfied the 
requirement. Furthermore, they discovered that in the non-complying companies which had 
substitutive monitoring instruments like an outside blockholder on the board or an 
institutional ownership concentration, new requirements had no effect on CEO compensation.  
 
Lastly, Brickley, Horn and Wedig (2010) investigated the determinants of CEO remuneration 
at non-profit hospitals in the U.S. Their results denoted that the presence of the CEO with 
voting rights on his own board and the proportion of management insiders on the board were 
both associated with higher CEO compensation.  
23 
 
5. HYPOTHESES 
 
In this chapter, I present the hypotheses about the relationship between compensation 
committee composition and CEO compensation. The hypotheses are based on the theories 
relating to executive compensation, the empirical findings of earlier research and the 
recommendations of the corporate governance codes. Altogether, there are five hypotheses 
which are discussed below. 
 
The first hypothesis concerns the non-independent directors. By a non-independent director I 
denote a director who is not independent of the company. The evaluation of director 
independence is based on the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate Governance Codes. 
The direct quote of the Recommendation 15 - Evaluation of independence of the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code 2008, can be seen in Table 15 in Appendix 1. A variable 
measuring some form of director independence is generally applied in studies investigating 
the relationship between compensation committee structure and CEO compensation. Usually 
the non-independent directors are assumed to be weak monitors of the CEO because of their 
close relationship with the CEO. The Finnish Corporate Governance Codes suggest that the 
majority of the directors should be independent directors, because it is their responsibility to 
supervise and control the management, which could be endangered if the directors were non-
independent of the company. On the basis of the reasoning above, the first hypothesis states 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher proportion of non-independent directors on the compensation 
committee is associated with a higher level of CEO base salary, cash compensation and total 
compensation. 
 
The second hypothesis relates to the long-serving directors. I define a director as a long-
serving director if he has sat ten consecutive years or more on the company’s board. An 
assumption made, for example by Vafeas (2003b), is that the long-serving directors are more 
likely to make friends with the CEO and less likely to monitor him. One explanation for this 
relationship, offered by Vafeas, states that the CEO may be able take over the director in time, 
as the director becomes less mobile and less employable. Vafeas also presents statistically 
significant evidence that the presence of a senior director on the compensation committee is 
associated with higher CEO compensation. In a similar vein, Sapp (2008) states that the board 
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is expected to be weaker when the tenure of the directors is longer, which should result in 
higher CEO compensation. Also Sapp provides statistical evidence that supports his 
hypothesized relationship. Finally, the Finnish Corporate Governance Codes indicate that 
long-term directorships may be problematic, which can be seen in one of the 
recommendations, which states that an outsider director with over 12 consecutive years of 
service on the company’s board, can be regarded as a non-independent director. On the basis 
of the above reasoning, the second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher proportion of long-serving directors on the compensation committee 
is associated with a higher level of CEO base salary, cash compensation and total 
compensation. 
 
Next I discuss the CEO-directors, by which I mean directors who are the CEOs of other 
companies. For example, Conyon et al. (2004) and Daily et al. (1998) used a variable 
measuring the proportion of CEO-directors on the compensation committee. It has been 
discovered in earlier research that the CEOs are quite a homogenous and coherent group of 
persons (Useem 1984). Thanks to this unity, the CEO-directors may have a tendency to back 
up other CEOs in the boardrooms (Lorsch and MacIver 1989). Derived from this, the third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of CEO-directors (i.e. other companies’ CEOs) on the 
compensation committee is associated with a higher level of CEO base salary, cash 
compensation and total compensation. 
 
The fourth hypothesis concerns the busy directors. A director is defined as busy if he serves 
on three or more additional boards. In the case that the director is retired, 6 or more additional 
board seats are required to make him busy. In this fashion, I use the same definition of the 
busy directors as, for example, Core et al. in 1999. The report by the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD) about director professionalism in 1996, stated that director 
professionalism requires a significant dedication of time, which limits the number of board 
seats the director can simultaneously keep. Furthermore, Cahan et al. (2005), Core et al. 
(1999) and Talmor et al. (2001) assumed that the directors’ additional board seats reduce their 
ability to properly take care of their board responsibilities. Also, the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Codes suggest that the directors should be able to devote a sufficient amount of 
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time in their board work, in order to thoroughly sink their teeth into the company matters. 
Based on above discussion, the fourth hypothesis states that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A higher proportion of busy directors on the compensation committee is 
associated with a higher level of CEO base salary, cash compensation and total compensation. 
 
The final hypothesis concerns the blockholder directors i.e. the directors with a significant 
ownership stake in the company. I define a director as a blockholder if he owns 10% or more 
of the company’s shares. According to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), the board can be 
expected to be more vigilant and to exercise tougher control over the CEO, when the directors 
are major shareholders and thus hold a considerable personal stake in the company. In a 
similar vein Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), assume that directors with a higher stock 
ownership have stronger incentives to monitor the CEO. Furthermore, Core et al. (1999) 
present that director shareholdings should result in lower CEO entrenchment. In the same 
spirit, the Finnish Corporate Governance Codes state that director shareholdings foster good 
corporate governance. Based on the discussion above, the last hypothesis suggests that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee is associated 
with a lower level of CEO base salary, cash compensation and total compensation. 
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6. DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter, the data and methods of this study are presented. I start by describing the data 
in Section 1. In Section 2, I explain the methods applied in this study and the common 
problems associated with the methods.  
 
6.1. Data 
 
This section presents the data of this thesis. The section is divided in four subsections. In 
Subsection 1, the sample and its formation are explained. Subsection 2 concerns CEO 
compensation. In Subsection 3, data related issues about the compensation committees are 
discussed. Finally, Subsection 4 deals with the control variables. 
 
6.1.1. Sample 
 
I started the sample formation by choosing all the companies that were listed on the 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki in September 2011. From this mass I searched for the companies 
that used a compensation committee in their internal governance at some point between 2006 
and 2009. This yielded altogether 236 firm-year observations. In the next stage, I removed the 
observations that had missing data, whose accounting period differed from the calendar year 
and where the CEO was replaced during the accounting period. I eliminated the observations 
where the CEO was replaced because it is unlikely, under the circumstances, that the pay 
package of the new CEO was determined in the previous year, as is assumed in this study. 
After these eliminations the sample size was 188 firm-year observations. In the final stage, I 
eliminated the outliers from the sample, in order to guarantee that the results are not distorted. 
An observation was regarded as an outlier if its value, in relation to any of the variables, was 
more than three standard deviations away from the mean of the variable. After this I reached 
the final sample which consists of 177 firm-year observations. 
 
As already mentioned above, the assumption in this thesis is that CEO compensation 
packages are determined in the previous year compared to the year when the actual payment 
is made. For example, Heiskanen (2008) and Holopainen (2010) made a similar assumption in 
their Master’s theses. This means that all the explanatory variables must be from the previous 
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year compared to the dependent variable i.e. CEO compensation. As a consequence, all the 
explanatory variables in this study are from the years 2006-2009, while the dependent 
variable which is CEO compensation is from the years 2007-2010. 
 
The yearly sample sizes are reported in Table 2 below.  As can be seen, the yearly sample size 
first increased steadily starting from 41 observations in 2006 and ending at 48 observations in 
2008. However, in 2009 the sample size decreased considerably ending up at 44 observations, 
as a consequence of the financial crisis, which caused several observations to be considered as 
outliers and accordingly to be removed from the sample. Lastly, Table 2 shows us that the 
size of the total sample is 177 firm-year observations. 
 
Table 2. Sample size per year 
This Table presents the yearly sample sizes from the perspective of the explanatory 
variables. All CEO compensation variables are from the subsequent year compared to the 
explanatory variables.  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Sample size 41 44 48 44 177 
 
 
Table 3 below shows how the total sample is divided between different industries. The 
industry classifications of the companies were obtained from the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, 
which applies the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) taxonomy.  
 
Table 3. Industry classification 
This Table presents the industry classification of the sample companies. The 
companies have been classified based on the GICS-industry classification used by the 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. In order to guarantee that each industry has, at least, a 
reasonable number of observations, Telecommunication services, Utilities and Energy 
sectors were left out of the analysis and the companies in these industries were 
transferred to some of the remaining sectors most suitable for them. Accordingly, 
Neste Oil Oyj from Energy sector and Fortum Oyj from Utilities sector were 
transferred to Materials sector and Elisa Oyj and TeliaSonera AB from 
Telecommunication services sector were transferred to Information technology sector. 
Industry 
Number of firm-year 
observations 
Percentage of firm-year 
observations 
Materials 33 18,6 % 
Industrials 40 22,6 % 
Consumer discretionary 32 18,1 % 
Consumer staples 11 6,2 % 
Health care 8 4,5 % 
Financials 17 9,6 % 
Information technology 36 20,3 % 
Total 177 100,0 % 
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In Figure 1 the division of the total sample into different industries is shown graphically. As 
can be seen, Industrials (22,6%), Information technology (20,3%), Materials (18,6%) and 
Consumer discretionary (18,1%) are clearly the largest industries. Financials is a midsized 
industry with 9,6% of the firm-year observations, whereas, Consumer staples (6,2%) and 
Health care (4,5%) are evidently the smallest industries in the sample.  
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of observations in different industries 
 
 
 
Table 4 reports the market cap segment classification of the total sample and in Figure 2 the 
same is illustrated graphically. As revealed by Figure 2, the total sample is centered in the 
large cap segment. More specifically, the majority (51,4%) of the firm-year observations 
belong to the large-cap segment. The mid cap segment comprises 32,8% of the firm-year 
observations, while small cap segment contains only 15,8% of the observations. 
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Table 4. Market cap segment classification 
This Table presents the market cap segment classification of the total sample. The 
classification follows the classification of the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. Accordingly, 
if the market value of the company is higher than 1 billion euros the company belongs 
to the large cap segment. If the market value of the company is lower than 150 million 
euros, the company belongs to the small cap segment. Finally, if the market value of 
the company is between 150 million euros and 1 billion euros, the company belongs to 
the mid cap segment. 
Segment Criterion 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage of 
observations 
Large cap Market value (€) > 1 billion 91 51,4 % 
Mid cap Market value (€) > 150 million and < 1 billion 58 32,8 % 
Small cap Market value  (€) < 150 million 28 15,8 % 
Total   177 100,0 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of observations in different market cap segments 
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6.1.2. CEO compensation 
 
I collected data concerning CEO compensation from the annual reports of the companies and 
from the companies’ websites. In gathering CEO compensation data, I had to decide how to 
select the year to which I allocate different forms of compensation. With base salary and 
bonuses the procedure is plain; they are both assigned to the year when the payment took 
place. However, with stock options, performance shares and other LTIPs the method is not 
that obvious. With stock options the question is whether they should be allocated to the year 
when they were granted or to the year when they were exercised. In this study, stock options 
are included in CEO compensation in the year they were granted, as is usually done in similar 
studies. In my opinion this is the clearest way to deal with stock options because we know the 
number of options and get the value of options by using the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model. As a consequence, the value of an option grant is easily calculated.  
 
With performance shares it is a different story. The number of performance shares to be 
handed over to the CEO is not known in advance because it depends on the company 
performance. Thus I cannot use the year when the performance share plan was brought into 
use, but instead, performance shares are included in CEO compensation in the year they were 
actually handed over to the CEO. At this point the number of performance shares is known 
and value of the package straightforwardly computed. Other LTIPs come in various forms. To 
keep things simple enough, other LTIPs are included in CEO compensation in the year they 
were paid. 
 
In this thesis, CEO compensation is measured by using three different instruments, which are 
base salary, cash compensation and total compensation. The use of several measures of CEO 
compensation enables an extensive study of the effects of compensation committee 
composition on CEO compensation. In this way, it is possible to analyze how certain 
compensation committee characteristics affect, on the one hand CEO base salary, and on the 
other hand total CEO compensation, for instance.  
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6.1.3. Compensation committee 
 
I gathered data about compensation committee characteristics from the annual reports of the 
companies, the corporate governance statements of the companies and from the companies’ 
home pages. In order to analyze the composition of the compensation committee extensively, 
I used five variables, which are typically applied in similar studies investigating either the 
relationship between compensation committee structure and CEO compensation or between 
board structure and CEO compensation. These five variables are: 1) the proportion of non-
independent directors on the compensation committee, 2) the proportion of long-serving 
directors on the compensation committee, 3) the proportion of CEO-directors on the 
compensation committee, 4) the proportion of busy directors on the compensation committee 
and 5) the presence of blockholder on the compensation committee. 
 
In order to provide general knowledge about the Finnish compensation committees, I also 
collected data about the compensation committee size, the number of compensation 
committee meetings, the attendance rate in these meetings and whether the compensation 
committee and the nomination committee were combined.  
 
6.1.4. Control variables 
 
I collected data about the characteristics that have been found to have an effect on CEO 
compensation in earlier studies and are supported by theory. In this study, these features are 
called control variables. I gathered data about the control variables from the Orbis database, 
the web pages of the companies, the annual reports of the companies and the Kauppalehti 
Online service. I divided the control variables into two sub-groups which are: 1) economic 
and ownership variables and 2) CEO variables. The economic and ownership variables 
measure company performance, size, ownership structure, growth opportunities and risk. The 
CEO variables measure length of tenure, age and stock ownership of the CEO. Below I go 
through these measures one by one, also pointing out the exact variable used in this thesis to 
measure the above-mentioned attributes. 
 
Performance: Under the agency theory it is assumed that executive compensation should be 
tied to performance, in order to motivate managers to strive for shareholder interests. 
Consequently the supposition is that better performance is associated with higher CEO 
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compensation, which is also statistically supported (e.g. Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; 
Murphy 1985). In this study stock return is used to measure company performance.  
 
Size: One of the well known relationships in the compensation literature is the positive 
connection between company size and CEO compensation. There is abundant statistical 
evidence backing up this relation (e.g. Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker 1999; Cyert, Kang and Kumar 2002). The reasoning behind this linkage is usually 
based on the complexity of the task of running a large organization (e.g. Talmor and Wallace 
2001). In this thesis, size is measured by using sales of the company. 
 
Ownership structure: It is generally assumed that having a major shareholder reduces agency 
costs, because major shareholder has an incentive and means to control and monitor the 
managers (e.g. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). For example, Core et al. (1999) and Sapp 
(2008) found that the presence of a blockholder statistically significantly reduced total CEO 
compensation. I incorporate in this study a dummy variable, which measures the presence of a 
major shareholder. Shareholder is considered as a major shareholder if he owns 20% or more 
of the shares of the company.  
 
Growth opportunities: Smith and Watts (1992) stated that the companies with more growth 
opportunities are expected to use more stock options and, altogether, pay higher compensation 
for their CEOs. They justify their statements by the difficulty of monitoring the managers 
when there are plenty of investment opportunities available for the CEO to choose from and 
by the special talent required in making economically significant investment decisions. 
Statistical evidence parallel with the above assertions is provided, for example, by Smith and 
Watts themselves, Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al. (2002). I employ M/B ratio to 
incorporate the effect of growth opportunities into the analysis.  
 
Risk: It is normally supposed that managers who have tied their non-diversifiable human 
capital in the company are risk-averse (e.g. Beatty and Zajac 1994). Because the risk relating 
to compensation cannot be effectively diversified away by the managers, they should be 
compensated for bearing this risk (Smith and Watts 1992). Smith and Watts further present 
that company risk and compensation risk are positively related, which means that the riskier 
companies should pay their managers more. For example Cyert et al. (2002) and Hoitash 
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(2011) discovered evidence that the riskier companies, actually, pay their CEOs more. In this 
thesis the standard deviation of stock return is used as a proxy for company risk. 
 
CEO tenure: The power of the CEO is expected to grow with the length of the tenure, 
resulting in a positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO compensation (e.g. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). Statistical evidence supporting the above mentioned 
relationship is provided, for example, by Newman and Mozes (1999) and Vafeas (2003).  
 
CEO age: The CEOs close to retirement carry only negligible career concerns and, 
consequently, their compensation should be most closely linked to current performance, in 
order to provide optimal incentives (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Gibbons and Murphy also 
present statistical support for their hypothesized relationship. 
  
CEO ownership: Under the agency theory the separation of ownership and control is seen as a 
source of agency problems (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983). Putting this other way around, it 
could be assumed that a higher CEO ownership is associated with a higher incentive 
alignment (e.g. Vafeas 2003a). In the context of CEO compensation, this would mean lower 
CEO compensation (Talmor and Wallace 2001). Statistical evidence for the above 
relationship is provided, for example, by Anderson and Bizjak 2003 and Core et al. 1999.  
 
In addition to the above control variables, I also included a state dummy and both industry 
and year dummies into the analysis, as is usually done in the comparable studies. Below in 
Table 5 the variables are summarized and definitions for them provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 5. List of variables and their definitions 
This Table presents the list of the variables and their definitions. All of the explanatory variables (compensation 
committee, economic and ownership, and CEO variables) are from the previous year compared to the dependent 
variable (CEO compensation). CC = compensation committee, NC = nomination committee. 
Compensation variables 
 
Base salary Consists of the CEO's salary and perquisites, measured in euros. 
Total cash compensation Sum of  the CEO's base salary and bonuses, measured in euros. 
Total compensation 
Sum of the CEO's base salary, bonuses, stock options, performance shares and 
other LTIPs, measured in euros. 
Compensation committee variables 
CC size Number of compensation committee members. 
CC and NC combined 
A dummy variable getting a value of 1 if the company had combined the 
compensation committee and the nomination committee, 0 otherwise 
Number of meetings Number of meetings held by the compensation committee. 
Attendance rate Attendance rate of compensation committee members on committee meetings.  
Proportion of non-independent 
Number of non-independent directors on the compensation committee divided 
by the number of all compensation committee members. Evaluation of director 
independence is based on the recommendations of the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Codes. See Appendix 1. 
Proportion of long-serving 
Number of long-serving directors on the compensation committee divided by 
the number of all compensation committee members. Director is regarded as 
long-serving if he has served 10 or more years on the company’s board.  
Proportion of CEOs 
Number of other companies' CEOs on the compensation committee divided by 
the number of all compensation committee members. Director is regarded as 
CEO if he is simultaneously some other company's CEO. 
Proportion of busy 
Number of busy directors on the compensation committee divided by the 
number of all compensation committee members. Director is regarded as busy 
if he has 3 or more additional board seats. In the case that director is retired, 6 
or more additional board seats are required in order to categorize him as busy.  
Blockholder on CC 
A dummy variable getting a value of 1 if somebody of the compensation 
committee members owns 10% or more of the company's shares, 0 otherwise. 
Economic and ownership variables 
Stock return Annual stock return including dividends, measured in percent. 
Sales Number of sales, measured in euros. 
20% block 
A dummy variable getting a value of 1 if the company has a blockholder who 
owns 20% or more of the company's shares, 0 otherwise.  
M/B ratio 
Market value of the company's stock divided by the book value of the 
company's stock. 
Volatility 
Annualized standard deviation of the daily stock returns for the past three 
years or which is available, measured in percent. 
CEO variables 
 
CEO tenure Length of CEO tenure, measured in years. 
CEO age Age of the CEO, measured in years. 
CEO ownership Percentage of the company's shares owned by the CEO, measured in percent. 
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6.2. Methods 
 
This section explains the methods applied in this thesis and the general problems associated 
with them. The section is divided in two subsections. In Subsection 1, the OLS linear 
regression method is discussed. Subsection 2 explains the common problems with relation to 
the regression analysis. 
 
6.3.1. OLS linear regression 
 
I apply the ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression method to analyze the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables, as is typically done in similar 
studies (e.g. Cahan et al. 2005; Conyon et al. 2004). Specifically, to test the effects of 
compensation committee characteristics and the control variables on CEO compensation, I 
estimate the following linear regression model: 
 
Ln (Compensation) = β0 + β1Economic and ownership variables + β2Compensation 
committee variables + β3CEO variables + β4State dummy + β5Industry dummies + β6Year 
dummies + ε 
 
In order to study the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable as extensively as possible, I have broken the regression model above into four 
different models. The amount of variables in the models increases model by model. More 
specifically, Model 1 includes only the economic and ownership variables. In Model 2 also 
the compensation committee variables are included. Model 3 already contains the economic 
and ownership variables, the compensation committee variables and the CEO variables. 
Finally, Model 4 is identical to the model presented above i.e. it includes the economic and 
ownership variables, the compensation committee variables, the CEO variables, the state 
dummy and both the industry and year dummies. The models are shown below. 
 
Model 1 
Ln (Compensation) = β0 + β1Economic and ownership variables + ε 
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Model 2 
Ln (Compensation) = β0 + β1Economic and ownership variables + β2Compensation 
committee variables + ε 
 
Model 3 
Ln (Compensation) = β0 + β1Economic and ownership variables + β2Compensation 
committee variables + β3CEO variables + ε 
 
Model 4 
Ln (Compensation) = β0 + β1Economic and ownership variables + β2Compensation 
committee variables + β3CEO variables + β4State dummy + β5Industry dummies + β6Year 
dummies + ε 
 
6.3.2. Common problems with regression analysis 
 
In order to obtain reliable results and draw credible conclusions from them, it is of the essence 
to recognize the common problems with the regression analysis and then seek to overcome 
these problems. Below I discuss three common problems with the regression analysis, which 
are multicollienarity, heteroscedasticity and outliers (e.g. Metsämuuronen 2008). To be more 
exact, I first explain the concept briefly and then describe how it is dealt with in this study. 
 
Multicollienarity refers to a situation where the explanatory variables are highly correlated. 
This could arise from the fact that there are two or more different variables measuring the 
same phenomenon. (Metsämuuronen 2008.) Multicollienarity may complicate the regression 
analysis and the interpretation of the regression results (Mellin 2006). With the purpose of 
identifying whether this study suffers from multicollienarity, I analyzed both the correlation 
coefficients and the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the explanatory variables. First, Table 
10 reports the correlation coefficients for the variables. As can be seen in Table 10, the 
highest correlation among the explanatory variables is between stock return and M/B ratio 
with a coefficient of 0,47. In general, a correlation coefficient of 0,80 or higher among the 
explanatory variables is considered as a sign of multicollinearity. As a result, the correlation 
coefficients suggest that multicollinearity should not be a problem in this study. Second, 
Appendix 3 presents the variance inflation factors of the explanatory variables. As revealed 
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by Appendix 3, the highest VIF is 3,24. The rule of thumb is that multicollinearity is an issue 
if VIF > 10 (Gujarati 2004). In this sense, it can be deduced from the VIF-values that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in this study. 
 
Heteroscedasticity means that the error terms do not have constant variance. In the presence 
of heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are biased, which in turn results in biased test 
statistics and confidence intervals. (Williams 2011a.) With the purpose of fighting off 
heteroscedasticity, I took the natural logarithms of all the CEO compensation variables, sales 
and CEO age. Logarithmic transformation is often suggested as a remedy for 
heteroscedasticity (e.g. Metsämuuronen 2008).  
  
Outlier is an observation that differs substantially from the other observations. The slope and 
the intercept of the least squares regression line are extremely vulnerable to outliers and, as a 
consequence, the outliers can twist the regression results (Williams 2011b). With the intention 
of preventing the outliers from distorting the regression results, I eliminated all the 
observations whose value, in relation to any of the variables, was more than three standard 
deviations away from the mean of the variable. As a result, 11 firm-year observations were 
removed from the initial sample.  
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7. RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, I present the results of my thesis. Section 1 discusses the descriptive results of 
the study. In Section 2, the correlation coefficients are reported. Finally, Section 3 presents 
the results of the regression analysis.  
 
7.1. Descriptive results 
 
In this section, the descriptive results about the compensation committees, CEO compensation 
and control variables are reported. The section is divided in four subsections. Subsection 1 
describes the development of the compensation committee usage among the Finnish listed 
companies. Subsection 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables. In Subsection 3, 
year-specific data about CEO compensation is provided. Finally, Subsection 4 reports year-
specific data about the explanatory variables. 
 
7.1.1. Development in compensation committee usage 
 
As can be seen in Table 6, the percentage of the Finnish listed companies using a 
compensation committee in their internal governance has increased moderately, starting from 
46,3% in 2006 and ending at 54,4% in 2010.  
 
Table 6. Compensation committee usage among Finnish listed companies 
This Table presents the compensation committee usage among the Finnish listed companies during 
2006-2010. The sample applied in this analysis includes the companies that were listed on NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki in September 2011. For this reason, this analysis is not a perfect representation of all 
the Finnish listed companies during 2006 and 2010 because it ignores companies that were delisted 
during January 2006 and August 2011.  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of companies 121 122 122 124 125 
Number of companies having a CC 56 59 58 63 68 
Percentage of companies having a CC 46,28 % 48,36 % 47,54 % 50,81 % 54,40 % 
 
 
 
However, the growth has not been stable, as revealed by Figure 3, which depicts the number 
of companies having a compensation committee in each year. First in 2007 the number of 
companies with a compensation committee rose somewhat from the previous year, whereas in 
2008 the growth turned into negative, albeit only by a whisker. In 2009 the number of 
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companies with a compensation committee started to increase again and this time the increase 
was considerable and this considerable growth continued also in 2010. I interpret this increase 
in compensation committee usage, at least to some extent, to reflect the Finnish Corporate 
Governance guidelines which encourage the companies to establish board committees and the 
increased importance of corporate governance altogether. 
 
Figure 3. Number of Finnish listed companies having a compensation committee during 2006-
2010 
 
 
 
7.1.2. Summary statistics of the variables 
 
Below in Table 7 we can see the summary statistics of the variables. I start by going through 
the summary statistics relating to CEO compensation. Mean total CEO compensation among 
the sample companies is €972 000 (median €766 000), as revealed by Table 7. These values 
are quite well in line with the results reported by Kopra (2012) and Talouselämä (2010). 
 
In more detail, Kopra (2012) presented that realized total compensation of the CEO in Finland 
in 2009 was €1 200 000 in the large cap segment, €520 000 in the mid cap segment and 
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€350 000 in the small cap segment. Keeping in mind from the previous chapter that in this 
study the observations are centered in the large cap segment (51,4% of the firm-year 
observations), it can be deduced that my results are quite close to those of Kopra, although 
somewhat higher. To be exact, by applying Kopra’s segment-specific compensation values to 
my sample (see the market cap segment classification in Table 4) the outcome is, 
0,514*€1 200 000 + 0,328*€520 000 + 0,158*€350 000 = €843 000. 
 
However, there are two matters that need to be considered, in order to draw correct 
conclusions. First of all, Kopra’s results about total CEO compensation include pension plans 
(which according to Kopra make up 11% of total compensation), unlike my results. Taking 
this into consideration, it suggests that my findings overstate the level of CEO compensation, 
because even without including pension plans I obtained higher values for CEO compensation 
than Kopra. But then again Kopra’s results are from the year 2009, whereas, my results are 
from the years 2007-2010. As will be seen in the next subsection, total CEO compensation 
unmistakably recorded its lowest value in 2009 (during the sample period). Taking this into 
account, it denotes that Kopra’s results understate the level of CEO compensation compared 
to my study, which is from the years 2007-2010. Altogether, it can be stated that the results 
reported in this thesis are quite parallel with those of Kopra.  
 
The results of this thesis concerning the level of total CEO compensation are additionally 
supported by the report of Talouselämä (2010). More specifically, the report of Talouselämä 
analyzed the level of total CEO compensation in 2009 in the 40 largest companies listed on 
the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. Their results indicated that average total CEO compensation 
(excluding pension plans) was approximately €930 000 in 2009. These results about total 
CEO compensation are very close to my findings.  
 
It is worth noticing, however, that Talouselämä’s sample consisted entirely of the large 
companies, whereas my sample, although centered in the large cap segment (51,4% of the 
observations), includes also a substantial amount of the mid cap (32,8% of the observations) 
and small cap companies (15,8% of the observations). Taking this into account, it suggests 
that my results somewhat overestimate the level of CEO compensation, because it is well-
known that CEO compensation grows with the size of the company. On the other hand, the 
results of Talouselämä are from 2009, and as turned out previously, this was the year when 
the total CEO compensation reached its bottom due to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. 
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Taking this into consideration, it means that Talouelämä’s results underestimate the level of 
CEO compensation compared to my study, which is from the years 2007-2010. All in all, it 
can be stated that my findings concerning total CEO compensation are quite well in line with 
the results of Talouselämä’s report.  
 
In relation to the contingent components of CEO compensation, it can be seen from Table 7 
that the mean value of bonuses is €165 000 (median €110 000). Furthermore, the average 
value of performance shares is €204 000 (median €0) and the corresponding figure for stock 
options is €82 000 (median €0). 
 
Figure 4 below, shows the proportions of the basic elements of CEO compensation as a 
percentage of total CEO compensation. From this figure we observe that base salary is, by far, 
the major component of CEO compensation by making up 67% of total compensation. Far 
behind come bonuses and performance shares constituting 15% and 12% of total 
compensation, respectively. Stock options are evidently the smallest component by making up 
only 6% of total CEO compensation. These figures are in line with the results reported by 
Kopra (2012). More specifically, Kopra’s results pointed out that the percentage of base 
salary from total CEO compensation was 59%. The corresponding values for bonuses and 
long term incentive compensation were 12% and 18% respectively.  
 
Nonetheless, there are two factors worthy of consideration. In the first place, as came out 
earlier in this subsection, Kopra’s results about total CEO compensation include pension 
plans, which make up 11% of total CEO compensation. If pension plans are eliminated from 
total compensation, (in order to make Kopra’s results more comparable with my study), the 
percentages of base salary, bonuses and long term incentive compensation increase slightly 
thus bringing them even closer to the values reported in this study. Second, Kopra’s results 
are from the year 2009, which is the year when total CEO compensation hit the bottom 
attributable to the financial crisis. As a consequence, Kopra’s results to some extent overstate 
the percentage of base salary and understate the percentages of the contingent components of 
compensation, compared to my thesis where the compensation figures are from the years 
2007-2010. All things considered, however, the figures reported here are strongly supported 
by Kopra’s results. 
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Table 7. Summary statistics for the variables 
This Table presents the summary statistics for the variables. The summary statistics are based on the total 
sample consisting of 177 firm-year observations. The summary statistics for other LTIPs are not reported 
because only in 3 out of 177 observations were other LTIPs used as an instrument to compensate the CEO. 
  
Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
CEO compensation variables 
     
Values 
     
Base salary (€) 517 867 506 689 241 348 125 814 1 353 248 
Bonuses (€) 165 252 110 400 241 949 0 2 348 877 
Cash compensation (€) 683 119 633 858 417 661 125 814 3 570 099 
Stock options (€) 81 623 0 247 005 0 1 780 776 
Performance shares (€) 203 371 0 451 946 0 2 650 450 
Total compensation (€) 972 221 765 539 868 523 131 700 5 942 503 
Proportions of total compensation 
     
Base salary 0,67 0,70 0,22 0,17 1,00 
Bonuses 0,15 0,15 0,12 0,00 0,71 
Stock options 0,06 0,00 0,13 0,00 0,71 
Performance shares 0,12 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,73 
Compensation committee variables 
     
CC size 3,30 3,00 0,73 2,00 5,00 
CC and NC combined 0,34 0,00 0,47 0,00 1,00 
Number of meetings 4,17 4,00 1,87 1,00 9,00 
Attendance rate 0,97 1,00 0,05 0,75 1,00 
Proportion of non-independent 0,10 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,67 
Proportion of long-serving 0,20 0,00 0,26 0,00 1,00 
Proportion of CEOs 0,29 0,33 0,25 0,00 1,00 
Proportion of busy 0,53 0,67 0,27 0,00 1,00 
Blockholder on CC 0,38 0,00 0,49 0,00 1,00 
CEO variables 
     
CEO tenure 4,18 3,00 3,18 0,00 13,00 
CEO age 50,95 51,00 4,62 42,00 60,00 
CEO ownership (%) 0,15 0,02 0,41 0,00 2,45 
Economic and ownership variables 
     
Stock return (%) 7,44 2,00 50,04 -93,82 165,00 
Sales (€ million) 3 698 1 671 7 046 7 51 058 
20% block 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,00 
MB ratio 2,26 1,71 1,71 0,17 8,05 
Volatility (%) 34,92 34,19 9,43 18,74 58,01 
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Figure 4. Basic elements of CEO compensation as a percentage of total compensation 
 
 
Relating to the compensation committees, Table 7 reveals that on average the compensation 
committee consist of 3,30 members, convenes 4,17 times during a financial year and 
attendance rate in the meetings is as high as 97%. In addition, we see that it is quite common 
(in 34% of the observations) to combine the compensation committee and the nomination 
committee into a single committee.  
 
Further, Table 7 shows that the average proportion of non-independent directors on the 
compensation committee is only 10% which could, to some extent, mirror the effect of the 
Finnish Corporate Governance guidelines striving to restrict non-independent director 
participation in the internal governance organs. Additionally, Table 7 reveals that the average 
proportion of long-serving directors (20%) and CEO-directors (29%) on the compensation 
committee is quite moderate. However, on average over half (53%) of the compensation 
committee members are interpreted as busy members. Finally, Table 7 shows that in 38% of 
the cases there is a blockholder (a person who owns at least a 10% ownership stake in the 
company) on the compensation committee. 
Base salary 
67 % 
Bonuses 
15 % 
Stock  
options 6 % 
Performance shares 
12 % 
44 
 
Focusing finally on the control variables, Table 7 indicates that the CEO is on average 50,95 
years old with a 4,18-year tenure as the CEO of the company and holds only a minor 
ownership stake in the company (mean 0,15% and median 0,02%).  In addition, we see that 
the mean annual stock return is 7,44% (median 2,00%). Table 7 also reveals that 50% percent 
of the sample companies have a major blockholder who owns, at least, 20% of the shares of 
the company. Finally, Table 7 illustrates that the average sales of the sample companies are 
about 3,7 billion euros (median 1,7 billion euros).  
 
 
7.1.3. Year-specific data about CEO compensation 
 
Table 8 below presents year-specific data about CEO compensation between 2007 and 2010. 
More specifically, Table 8 reports mean and median values of the different compensation 
components and also their proportions of total compensation. As can be seen from Table 8, 
mean base salary has increased from €472 000 in 2007 to €551 000 in 2010. However, the 
increase has not been unbroken, as revealed by Figure 5. Rather, average base salary first rose 
quite steeply in 2008 from the previous year but then turned into a slight decrease in 2009. In 
2010 base salary started to increase again but this time with only a modest rate. With median 
base salary the direction of the yearly changes has been parallel with mean base salary but the 
rate of change has differed, as indicated by Figure 5. I suppose that the decrease in base salary 
of the CEO in 2009 could be explained, at least to some extent, by the financial crisis of the 
late 2000s, which culminated in the breakdown of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (e.g. 
European Trade Union Confederation 2010). My supposition is that as a response to the crisis, 
the companies may have frozen salaries of their CEOs to the level of the previous year and 
some companies may even have cut back salaries of their executives.  
 
Table 8 and Figure 6 below show the development of the contingent components of CEO 
compensation. As can be seen, the trend in bonuses and performance shares has been quite 
parallel. They both reached their bottom in 2009 following the poor performance of the 
companies in the previous year, caused mainly by the financial crisis, which suppressed 
economic activity. Stock options, however, have remained quite stable throughout the period.  
 
Finally, the development of total CEO compensation during 2007-2010 is shown in Table 8 
and Figure 7 below. As revealed, the level of mean total CEO compensation has been quite 
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stable around one million euros, except for the year 2009 when it sank below €900 000, 
reflecting the development of the components of total CEO compensation and, consequently, 
the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Alternatively, median total CEO compensation has 
increased during the period starting from €672 000 in 2007 and ending at €828 000 in 2010, 
although, also median total CEO compensation slightly declined in 2009. Consequently, we 
can observe from Figure 7 that the gap between mean and median total CEO compensation 
has considerably narrowed during the period. 
 
 
Table 8. Year-specific data about CEO compensation 
This Table presents year-specific information about different components of CEO compensation 
between 2007 and 2010, based on the yearly samples. The figures for other LTIPs are not reported 
because only in 3 out of 177 firm-year observations were other LTIPs used as an instrument to 
compensate the CEO. 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
CEO compensation variables 
    
Mean values 
    
Base salary (€) 471 897 528 638 516 691 551 214 
Bonuses (€) 210 316 169 867 130 421 156 644 
Cash compensation (€) 682 213 698 504 647 112 707 858 
Stock options (€) 74 448 77 845 90 070 82 873 
Performance shares (€) 230 829 226 927 143 284 219 780 
Total compensation (€) 994 247 1 003 276 880 466 1 020 738 
Median values 
    
Base salary (€) 475 961 499 517 487 736 543 984 
Bonuses (€) 114 000 124 511 80 610 126 410 
Cash compensation (€) 585 088 653 237 607 739 680 418 
Stock options (€) 0 0 0 0 
Performance shares (€) 0 1 963 0 0 
Total compensation (€) 672 000 757 770 736 666 828 251 
Mean proportions of total compensation  
    
Base salary 0,65 0,64 0,71 0,66 
Bonuses 0,16 0,16 0,13 0,15 
Stock options 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 
Performance shares 0,12 0,14 0,09 0,13 
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Figure 5. Development of CEO base salary during 2007-2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Development of contingent components of CEO compensation during 2007-2010 
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Figure 7. Development of total CEO compensation during 2007-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1.4. Year-specific data about explanatory variables  
 
Table 9 below provides year-specific information about the compensation committee and 
control variables between 2006 and 2009. I start by discussing compensation committee 
variables. First, as can be seen both in Table 9 and Figure 8 below, the proportion of non-
independent directors has decreased during the period starting from 0,13 and ending at 0,07. I 
assume this reduction could, at least to some extent, be explained by the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Codes which aim at limiting the number of non-independent directors on the 
boards and board committees. Second, the proportion of CEO-directors has also declined 
during the sample period, starting from 0,32 and ending at 0,28 although the reduction has not 
been constant, as revealed by Figure 8. Third, as shown in Table 9 and Figure 8, the 
proportion of long-serving directors initially somewhat decreased in 2007 from the previous 
year but after that started to increase ending at 0,23 in 2009. Finally, as reported in Table 9 
and Figure 9, the proportion of busy directors reached its peak value 0,58 in 2006 and 
thereafter remained quite stable at around 0,52 for the rest of the period.  
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The impact of the financial crisis of the late 2000s is clearly reflected in the economic 
variables, as revealed by Table 9 below. First, the stock returns plummeted in 2008 (around -
45%) when the financial crisis hit its peak. However, the stock returns started to recover 
already in 2009, as can be seen in Table 9. The M/B ratios understandably followed the same 
path as the stock returns. Second, the volatilities of the stock returns increased rapidly in 2008 
and 2009, as the uncertainty in the markets spread, in consequence of the financial crisis. 
Finally, the sales of the companies started to decline on the second half of 2008 as the 
financial crisis undermined consumer confidence, resulting in reduced consumption which 
continued in 2009, as revealed by Table 9 below.  
 
 
Table 9. Year-specific data about compensation committee and control variables 
This Table presents year-specific information about the compensation committee and control 
variables between 2006 and 2009, based on the yearly samples. Values are mean values. 
Attendance rate for the year 2006 is not reported, because only five companies reported their 
compensation committee attendance rate in the annual report of 2006. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Compensation committee variables 
    
CC size 3,24 3,30 3,23 3,43 
CC and NC combined 0,32 0,30 0,33 0,41 
Number of meetings 4,09 4,26 3,87 4,48 
Attendance rate 
 
0,97 0,97 0,98 
Proportion of non-independent 0,13 0,13 0,09 0,07 
Proportion of long-serving 0,19 0,17 0,22 0,23 
Proportion of CEOs 0,32 0,29 0,27 0,28 
Proportion of busy 0,58 0,52 0,51 0,53 
Blockholder on CC 0,41 0,34 0,38 0,39 
CEO variables 
    
CEO tenure 4,07 3,98 3,94 4,73 
CEO age 51,12 50,43 50,56 51,75 
CEO ownership (%) 0,16 0,13 0,14 0,17 
Economic and ownership variables 
    
Stock return (%) 30,31 -1,19 -44,57 51,49 
Sales (€ million) 3 432 4 268 4 206 2 823 
20% block 0,51 0,43 0,48 0,57 
MB ratio 3,04 2,56 1,54 2,01 
Volatility (%) 27,62 30,01 38,71 42,51 
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Figure 8. Compensation committee variables during 2006-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Compensation committee variables during 2006 – 2009 
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7.2. Correlation coefficients 
 
Table 10 below reports both the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the 
variables. The correlation coefficients in Table 10 support two well-known relationships in 
compensation literature, which are: 1) the positive relationship between company size and 
CEO compensation and 2) the positive relationship between company performance and CEO 
compensation. More specifically, sales have extremely strong positive correlation with all 
three measures of CEO compensation both in Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices, 
as indicated by the correlation coefficients varying between 0,757 and 0,903. Second, stock 
return is significantly positively correlated with total CEO compensation in both matrices, as 
indicated by the correlation coefficients of 0,198 and 0,232.  
 
The correlation coefficients between the compensation committee variables and CEO 
compensation present two statistically significant relationships, as revealed by Table 10. First, 
the presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee has a significant negative 
correlation coefficient with all three measures of CEO compensation in Pearson’s correlation 
matrix and with total compensation in Spearman’s matrix. This result is in line with 
Hypothesis 5. Second, the proportion of long-serving directors on the compensation 
committee has a significant negative correlation coefficient with total CEO compensation in 
Pearson’s correlation matrix, which is contrary to Hypothesis 2. 
 
Finally, as can be seen from Table 10 below, CEO age is significantly positively correlated 
with all measures of CEO compensation in both matrices, whereas CEO ownership has a 
significant negative correlation coefficient with all of the CEO compensation measures in 
both matrices, as well.  
 
Metsämuuronen (2008) stated that too high correlations between the explanatory variables 
cause multicollinearity. As revealed by Table 10, the highest correlation among the 
explanatory variables is between stock return and M/B ratio with a coefficient of 0,467. This 
indicates that the explanatory variables are not highly correlated with each other and, 
accordingly, multicollinearity should not be a serious issue. See Subsection 6.3.2 for further 
information about multicollinearity. 
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Table 10. Pearson’s and Spearman's correlation matrices 
This Table presents both the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the variables. Pearson's correlations are reported in the lower section of the Table and 
Spearman's correlations in the upper section of the Table. Symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Ln 
(total 
comp.) 
Ln 
(cash 
comp.) 
Ln 
(base 
salary) 
Prop. of 
non-
indep. 
Prop. of 
long-s. 
Prop. of 
CEOs 
Prop. of 
busy 
Blockh. 
on CC 
Stock 
return 
Ln 
(sales) 
20% 
block 
CEO 
tenure 
Ln 
(CEO 
age) 
CEO 
ownership 
M/B 
ratio 
Volatility 
Ln (total comp.) 
 
,896** ,818** ,070 -,147 ,012 -,097 -,234** ,232** ,757** -,087 ,090 ,235** -,239** ,007 -,040 
Ln (cash comp.) ,909** 
 
,928** ,046 -,086 ,019 -,117 -,145 ,151* ,840** ,004 ,096 ,330** -,283** -,075 -,037 
Ln (base salary) ,841** ,935** 
 
,010 ,000 -,002 -,106 -,146 ,060 ,880** ,045 ,045 ,308** -,330** -,167* -,015 
Prop. of non-indep. ,052 ,014 -,006 
 
,181* -,024 -,027 ,254** -,004 ,185* ,081 ,102 ,088 ,015 ,153* -,090 
Prop. of long-s. -,156* -,101 -,039 ,163* 
 
,033 ,059 ,234** -,072 -,034 ,034 ,159* -,019 ,070 ,002 -,082 
Prop. of CEOs ,027 ,060 ,028 -,001 ,029 
 
,219** -,105 ,101 ,025 -,028 ,147 ,004 -,116 ,046 ,016 
Prop. of busy -,144 -,129 -,137 -,005 ,069 ,212** 
 
,040 ,071 -,073 ,079 -,098 -,030 ,102 ,009 ,101 
Blockh. on CC -,219** -,165* -,169* ,251** ,210** -,108 ,040 
 
-,019 -,137 ,389** ,020 ,167* ,187* ,097 ,025 
Stock return ,198* ,125 ,047 -,045 -,052 ,099 ,088 -,005 
 
,012 ,011 ,091 ,143 ,037 ,467** -,140 
Ln (sales) ,795** ,874** ,903** ,151* -,041 ,084 -,059 -,162* ,033 
 
,093 -,018 ,313** -,426** -,165* -,009 
20% block -,098 -,018 ,008 ,075 ,012 -,027 ,087 ,389** ,028 ,048 
 
-,066 ,196** ,090 -,123 ,107 
CEO tenure ,053 ,072 ,024 ,147 ,262** ,190* -,084 ,082 ,073 -,010 -,037 
 
,381** ,278** ,101 -,005 
Ln (CEO age) ,172* ,246** ,222** ,061 ,016 ,015 -,028 ,163* ,148* ,242** ,200** ,392** 
 
,028 ,047 ,071 
CEO ownership -,196** -,201** -,273** ,075 ,156* -,094 ,070 ,190* -,001 -,264** ,101 ,168* ,116 
 
,059 ,122 
M/B ratio ,053 -,055 -,149* ,109 ,035 -,022 ,017 ,125 ,291** -,136 -,108 ,019 -,021 ,024 
 
-,397** 
Volatility -,070 -,048 -,021 -,091 -,101 ,028 ,094 ,023 -,045 -,054 ,123 -,022 ,072 -,021 -,306**   
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7.3. Regression results 
 
 
In this section, I present the results of the OLS regressions. The section is split in four 
subsections. Subsection 1 reports the results of the CEO base salary regressions. In 
Subsection 2, the results of the CEO cash compensation regressions are introduced. 
Subsection 3 reports the results of the total CEO compensation regressions and finally, 
Subsection 4 analyzes the robustness of the results.  
 
7.3.1. CEO base salary 
 
The regression results in Table 11 below reveal some unexpected features about the 
relationship between compensation committee composition and CEO base salary. First of all, 
the results indicate that the proportion of non-independent directors on the compensation 
committee has a statistically strong negative impact on CEO base salary, which is contrary to 
Hypothesis 1. Specifically, the coefficients for the proportion of non-independent directors 
vary between -0,39 and -0,45 and are statistically significant at the 0,1% level (t-statistics 
between -4,64 and -4,96) in all the models including the compensation committee variables. 
These results, although somewhat surprising, are parallel with the findings of Sapp (2008) 
who found that the proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee was, 
in fact, positively associated with the level of CEO compensation. In addition, these results 
receive partial support from the findings of Boyd (1994) and Core et al. (1999), who found 
that the percentage of insider directors had a negative impact on the level of CEO 
compensation. The word partial is used above, because non-independent director (which is 
applied in this study) is a much more extensive concept than insider director. In more detail, 
insider status is just one of the several criteria that make the director to be regarded as non-
independent (see Appendix 1 for further information).  
 
Second, the regression results present statistical evidence that the proportion of busy directors 
has a negative effect on CEO base salary, which is contrary to Hypothesis 4. In more detail, 
the results indicate that the proportion of busy directors on the compensation committee has a 
negative coefficient -0,14 in Model 2 and -0,12 in Model 3, which are both statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In Model 4 the coefficient is also negative, but, however, not 
statistically significant. These findings, although opposite to Hypothesis 4, are supported by 
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Sun et al. (2009a) who discovered that a higher proportion of busy directors on the 
compensation committee was associated with compensation packages that were more 
congruent with shareholder interests. 
 
Third, the results provide weak statistical evidence of a negative relationship between the 
proportion of CEO-directors and CEO base salary. More specifically, in Model 4 the 
coefficient for the proportion of CEO-directors is -0,12 which is narrowly statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In the other models, however, the coefficient for CEO-directors is 
statistically insignificant. Finally, the results indicate that neither the proportion of long-
serving directors nor the presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee has a 
statistically significant association with CEO base salary.  
 
In relation to the control variables, we can observe from Table 11 that sales have a 
particularly strong positive effect on CEO base salary. In all four models, sales are 
statistically significant, at the 0,1% level (t-statistics between 25,15 and 28,86). The 
coefficients for sales are approximately 0,24 in all four models, indicating that a sensitivity 
between sales and CEO base salary is about 0,24. These findings are consistent with the 
general result in compensation studies, namely, that CEO compensation grows with the size 
of the company (e.g. Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). 
 
The regression results about the industry and year dummies, which are not reported here, 
present four statistically strong relationships. First, the IT, Materials and Financials industry 
have all positive coefficients of the magnitude of 0,19, 0,19 and 0,21, respectively, which are 
statistically significant at 0,1%, 0,1% and 1% level, respectively. Consequently, the IT, 
Materials and Financials industry are all associated with statistically significantly higher CEO 
base salaries than the benchmark industry Industrials.  Second, the coefficient for the year 
2010 is 0,17 and statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that in the year 2010 CEO 
base salaries were statistically significantly 18,5% higher than in the benchmark year 2007.  
When the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the transformation (e
βx
 – 1) *100% for 
the independent variable must be done, in order to discover its economic significance, as 
suggested by Anderson et al. (2003). Accordingly, the economic significance of the year 2010 
dummy is (e
0,17
 – 1)*100% = 18,5%. 
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Finally, the state dummy, which is not reported here either, has no statistically significant 
relationship with CEO base salary. More specifically, the coefficient for the state dummy is -
0,06 and t-statistic is -1,28. (Note: the state dummy measures whether the State of Finland is a 
significant shareholder of the company with at least 10% ownership stake) 
 
The significance and suitability of the models are highly appropriate. In the first place, the F-
statistics of the models vary between 51,6 and 154,5 with p-values < 0,001 indicating that all 
the models are jointly highly significant. Secondly, the adjusted R
2 
-values of the models 
range from 81,3% to 86,9%, denoting that the explanatory power of the models is especially 
high. 
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Table 11. Regressions of CEO base salary on compensation committee variables and control 
variables 
This Table shows the results of the OLS regressions of CEO base salary on compensation committee and 
control variables.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The total sample, including 177 firm-year 
observations, is used in the regressions.  Dependent variable is ln (base salary) which includes CEO's salary 
and perquisites. In Model 4, which includes industry and year dummies, Industrials is used as benchmark 
industry and 2007 as benchmark year to which other industries and years are compared to. Symbols *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% level, respectively. 
  Pred. 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Ln (base salary) Ln (base salary) Ln (base salary) Ln (base salary) 
Economic and ownership variables 
     
Stock return + 0,03 0,03 0,02 -0,02 
  
(0,84) (0,86) (0,79) (-0,52) 
Ln (sales) + 0,23*** 0,24*** 0,24*** 0,24*** 
  
(27,16) (28,86) (26,56) (25,15) 
20% block - -0,04 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 
  
(-1,27) (-1,05) (-0,80) (-0,71) 
M/B ratio - -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 
  
(-0,88) (-0,39) (-0,37) (1,95) 
Volatility + 0,13 0,14 0,14 -0,30 
  
(0,71) (0,87) (0,84) (-1,42) 
Compensation committee variables 
     
Proportion of non-independent + 
 
-0,39*** -0,41*** -0,45*** 
   
(-4,64) (-4,77) (-4,96) 
Proportion of long-serving + 
 
0,05 0,03 0,01 
   
(0,95) (0,54) (0,18) 
Proportion of CEOs + 
 
-0,07 -0,10 -0,12* 
   
(-1,16) (-1,62) (-1,99) 
Proportion of busy + 
 
-0,14* -0,12* -0,08 
   
(-2,54) (-2,17) (-1,44) 
Blockholder on CC - 
 
0,03 0,03 0,06 
   
(0,77) (0,83) (1,79) 
CEO variables 
     
CEO tenure + 
  
0,01 0,01 
    
(1,77) (1,90) 
Ln (CEO age) + 
  
-0,12 0,01 
    
(-0,60) (0,06) 
CEO ownership - 
  
-3,43 -3,14 
    
(-0,88) (-0,87) 
Constant 
 
8,17*** 8,11*** 8,52*** 8,00*** 
  
(40,19) (41,01) (12,02) (11,02) 
State dummy 
 
No No No Yes 
Industry and year dummies 
 
No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 
 
0,813 0,838 0,839 0,869 
F-statistic 
 
154,538*** 92,236*** 71,512*** 51,654*** 
Observations   177 177 177 177 
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7.3.2. CEO cash compensation 
 
 
In relation to the compensation committee variables, the results of the CEO cash 
compensation regressions are somewhat in line with the findings of the CEO base salary 
regressions. Accordingly, the proportion of non-independent directors on the compensation 
committee has a statistically strong negative effect also on CEO cash compensation. In more 
detail, the coefficients for the proportion of non-independent directors vary between -0,37 and 
-0,55 and are statistically significant at the 1% level in Model 2 (t-statistic -3,28) and at the 
0,1% level in Models 3 and 4 (t-statistics -3,77 and -4,42). Similarly, the proportion of busy 
directors has maintained its significant negative association with CEO compensation, albeit 
narrowly. More specifically, the coefficient for the proportion of busy directors is -0,17 in 
Model 2, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In the other models the coefficients 
are also negative but, nevertheless, statistically insignificant.  
 
However, as the results in Table 12 below suggest, the proportion of long-serving directors is 
no longer statistically insignificant as it was in CEO base salary regressions. Rather the 
proportion of long-serving directors has a statistically significant negative effect on CEO cash 
compensation, which is against Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the coefficient for the proportion 
of long-serving directors is -0,16 in Model 3 and -0,20 in Model 4, which are both statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Parallel findings have been reported by Sun et al. (2009a) who 
discovered that a higher proportion of long-serving directors resulted in compensation 
packages that were more aligned with shareholder interests.  
 
Finally, the regression results in Table 12 indicate, that there are two compensation committee 
characteristics that have no statistically significant relationship with CEO cash compensation. 
First, the presence of a blockholder on the compensation committee remains as a statistically 
insignificant factor in CEO compensation. Second, the proportion of CEO-directors has lost 
even its weak significance it had in CEO base salary regressions. This result concerning CEO-
directors is analogous with the findings of Daily et al. (1998) and Conyon et al. (2004), who 
discovered that the proportion of CEO-directors on the compensation committee had no effect 
on CEO compensation.  
 
With regard to the control variables, the regression results in Table 12 below show that there 
are several statistically significant relationships. In the first place, sales have a statistically 
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particularly strong positive impact on CEO cash compensation, in the same way as they had 
on CEO base salary. Specifically, the coefficients for sales vary between 0,27 and 0,29 and 
are statistically significant, at the 0,1% level (t-statistics between 22,40 and 24,47) in all four 
models. Second, the results provide statistical evidence that stock return has a positive 
relationship with CEO cash compensation. In more detail, stock return has a positive 
coefficient in all of the models, and in three out of four models the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Third, there is statistical evidence that M/B ratio is associated with 
higher CEO cash compensation. More specifically, in Model 4 the coefficient for M/B ratio is 
0,04 which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In the other models the coefficients for 
M/B ratio are also positive, but not statistically significant. Finally, CEO tenure has a 
statistically significant positive relationship with CEO cash compensation in Model 3. To be 
more precise, the coefficient of CEO tenure in Model 3 is 0,02 which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
The industry and year dummies, which are not reported here, reveal two statistically 
significant relationships. First, the Financials industry has a positive coefficient of 0,29 which 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Second, the IT industry also has a positive 
coefficient of the magnitude of 0,20 which is statistically significant at the 1% level as well. 
Consequently, the results suggest that in the Financials and IT industry CEO cash 
compensation is statistically significantly higher compared to the benchmark industry 
Industrials. Finally, the results indicate that the year dummies have no statistically significant 
effect on CEO cash compensation.  
 
Finally, the state dummy, which is not reported here, has a statistically significant negative 
association with CEO cash compensation. In more detail, the coefficient for the state dummy 
is -0,16 which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistic -2,60).  
 
The significance and fit of the regression models are highly appropriate, as was the case also 
with the CEO base salary regression models. Accordingly, all the models are highly jointly 
significant, as indicated by the F-statistics ranging from 35,8 to 120,0 with p-values < 0,001. 
Similarly, the explanatory power of the models is strong, as suggested by the adjusted R
2 –
values of about 80%.  
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Table 12. Regressions of CEO cash compensation on compensation committee and control 
variables 
This Table shows the results of the OLS regressions of CEO cash compensation on compensation committee 
and control variables.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The total sample, including 177 firm-year 
observations, is used in the regressions.  Dependent variable is ln (cash compensation) which includes base 
salary and bonuses. In Model 4, which includes industry and year dummies, Industrials is used as benchmark 
industry and 2007 as benchmark year to which other industries and years are compared to. Symbols *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% level, respectively. 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
Pred. 
sign 
Ln (cash 
compensation) 
Ln (cash 
compensation) 
Ln (cash 
compensation) 
Ln (cash 
compensation) 
Economic and ownership variables 
     
Stock return + 0,10* 0,09* 0,08* 0,06 
  
(2,30) (2,21) (2,00) (1,06) 
Ln (sales) + 0,27*** 0,27*** 0,28*** 0,29*** 
  
(24,00) (24,47) (23,59) (22,40) 
20% block - -0,07 -0,07 -0,06 -0,06 
  
(-1,66) (-1,50) (-1,37) (-1,39) 
M/B ratio + 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,04** 
  
(0,99) (1,38) (1,56) (2,69) 
Volatility + 0,14 0,12 0,13 -0,15 
  
(0,62) (0,53) (0,60) (-0,51) 
Compensation committee variables 
     
Proportion of non-independent + 
 
-0,37** -0,43*** -0,55*** 
   
(-3,28) (-3,77) (-4,42) 
Proportion of long-serving + 
 
-0,09 -0,16* -0,20* 
   
(-1,12) (-2,03) (-2,46) 
Proportion of CEOs + 
 
-0,01 -0,05 -0,08 
   
(-0,09) (-0,61) (-0,94) 
Proportion of busy + 
 
-0,17* -0,14 -0,12 
   
(-2,20) (-1,85) (-1,47) 
Blockholder on CC - 
 
0,05 0,04 0,07 
   
(0,95) (0,83) (1,60) 
CEO variables 
     
CEO tenure + 
  
0,02** 0,01 
    
(2,69) (1,73) 
Ln (CEO age) + 
  
-0,15 0,17 
    
(-0,61) (0,65) 
CEO ownership - 
  
7,03 8,43 
    
(1,37) (1,69) 
Constant 
 
7,64*** 7,64*** 8,00*** 6,48*** 
  
(28,98) (28,84) (8,60) (6,49) 
State dummy 
 
No No No Yes 
Industry and year dummies 
 
No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 
 
0,772 0,789 0,798 0,820 
F-statistic 
 
120,013*** 66,797*** 54,578*** 35,787*** 
Observations   177 177 177 177 
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7.3.3. Total CEO compensation 
 
The regression results in Table 13 below indicate that three compensation committee 
characteristics that were statistically significant in CEO cash compensation regressions 
remain significant also in total CEO compensation regressions. First, the proportion of long-
serving directors on the compensation committee has a negative effect on total CEO 
compensation, just like it had on CEO cash compensation. However, with total CEO 
compensation the negative effect is statistically stronger. Specifically, the coefficients for the 
proportion of long-serving directors range from -0,25 to -0,39 and are statistically significant 
at the 5% level in Model 2 and at the 1% level in Models 3 and 4. 
 
Second, the proportion of non-independent directors has a statistically significant negative 
effect also on total CEO compensation, although only in one of the models. In more detail,  
the coefficient for the proportion of non-independent directors is -0,39 in Model 4, which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In the other models the coefficients are also negative 
but not statistically significant. Third, the proportion of busy directors on the compensation 
committee is significantly negatively associated with total CEO compensation in Model 2, 
exactly as it was with CEO cash compensation. More specifically, the coefficient for the 
proportion of busy directors in Model 2 is -0,24 which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Although the coefficients for the proportion of busy directors are negative in the other 
models as well, they are, however, not statistically significant. 
 
Finally, the proportion of CEO-directors and the presence of a blockholder on the 
compensation committee remain statistically insignificant factors in total CEO compensation, 
as they were in CEO cash compensation. 
  
With respect to the control variables, Table 13 shows that there are several statistically 
significant relationships. First, sales have a statistically particularly strong positive impact on 
total CEO compensation in the same way as it had on CEO base salary and CEO cash 
compensation. In more detail, the coefficients for sales are between 0,31 and 0,33 and are 
statistically significant at the 0,1% level (t-statistics between 16,13 and 18,82) in all four 
models. Secondly, stock return has a statistically significant positive effect on total CEO 
compensation. More specifically, the coefficients for stock return vary between 0,20 and 0,27 
and are statistically significant  at the 1% level in all four models. This finding is consistent 
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with the tenets of the agency theory, namely that executive compensation should be tied to 
performance. Statistical support for this finding is provided, for instance, by Murphy (1985) 
and Cyert et al. (2002).   
 
Third, the existence of a 20% block (i.e. a blockholder who owns at least 20% of the 
company’s shares) is negatively associated with total CEO compensation. To be specific, the 
coefficients for a 20% block range from -0,13 to -0,19 and are statistically significant, at least, 
at the 5% level in all the models. This finding is in harmony with the general assumption that 
having a blockholder reduces agency problems, because a blockholder has both incentive and 
means to control the managers. Similar findings have been reported, for instance, by Core et 
al. (1999) and Sapp (2008). Fourth, M/B ratio, which measures growth opportunities, has a 
statistically significant positive effect on total CEO compensation. In more detail, the 
coefficients for M/B ratio are between 0,05 and 0,08 and are statistically significant in all four 
models with differing significance levels. Similar results are reported, for example, by Smith 
et al. (1992) and Core et al. (1999).  
 
Finally, the results in Table 13 below provide evidence of a positive relationship between 
CEO tenure and total CEO compensation. To be exact, the coefficient for CEO tenure in 
Model 3 is 0,03 denoting that one additional year in CEO tenure is associated with an increase 
of about 3% [(e0,03 – 1)*100% = 3,0%] in total CEO compensation. The coefficient for CEO 
tenure in Model 3 is statistically significant at the 5% level, as indicated by the t-statistic of 
the magnitude of 2,37. In Model 4, however, the coefficient for CEO tenure, although positive 
(0,02), is no longer statistically significant. Statistical evidence of a positive relationship 
between CEO tenure and CEO compensation has been presented earlier, for example by 
Newman et al. (1999) and Vafeas (2003).  
 
With regard to the industry and year dummies which are not reported here, there is only one 
statistically significant relationship, which concerns the Financials industry. More 
specifically, the Financials industry is associated with statistically significantly higher total 
CEO compensation than the benchmark industry Industrials, as denoted by the regression  
coefficient of 0,40 for the Financials industry, which is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(t-statistic 2,94). The coefficient for the Financials industry indicates that total CEO 
compensation is about 49% [(e0,40 – 1)*100% = 49,2%]  higher in the Financials industry than 
in the benchmark industry Industrials.  
61 
 
Finally, the state dummy is not statistically significant, but it has a negative coefficient as it 
had in CEO base salary and cash compensation regressions. In more detail, the coefficient for 
the state dummy is -0,18 and its t-statistic is -1,79. 
 
All the models are appropriate by their significance and suitability, as indicated by the F-
statistics and R
2 –values. More specifically, the F-statistics of the models range between 20,9 
and 76,8 with p-values < 0,001 denoting that all the models are jointly significant. 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of the models is high, as indicated by the adjusted R
2
-
values of the models of about 70%. 
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Table 13. Regressions of total CEO compensation on compensation committee and control 
variables 
This Table shows the results of the OLS regressions of total CEO compensation on compensation committee 
and control variables.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The total sample, including 177 firm-year 
observations, is used in the regressions.  Dependent variable is ln (total compensation) which includes base 
salary, bonuses, stock options, restricted stocks and other LTIPs. In Model 4, which includes industry and year 
dummies, Industrials is used as benchmark industry and 2007 as benchmark year to which other industries and 
years are compared to. Symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% level, 
respectively. 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
Pred. 
sign 
Ln (total 
compensation) 
Ln (total 
compensation) 
Ln (total 
compensation) 
Ln (total 
compensation) 
Economic and ownership variables 
     
Stock return + 0,20** 0,20** 0,20** 0,27** 
  
(3,17) (3,21) (3,18) (2,89) 
Ln (sales) + 0,31*** 0,31*** 0,33*** 0,33*** 
  
(18,82) (18,50) (18,07) (16,13) 
20% block - -0,19** -0,15* -0,13* -0,15* 
  
(-3,06) (-2,29) (-2,05) (-2,25) 
M/B ratio + 0,05* 0,05** 0,06** 0,08*** 
  
(2,48) (2,81) (2,98) (3,65) 
Volatility + 0,25 0,23 0,28 0,01 
  
(0,74) (0,70) (0,84) (0,03) 
Compensation committee variables 
     
Proportion of non-independent + 
 
-0,17 -0,24 -0,39* 
   
(-1,00) (-1,43) (-1,99) 
Proportion of long-serving + 
 
-0,25* -0,35** -0,39** 
   
(-2,19) (-2,91) (-3,05) 
Proportion of CEOs + 
 
-0,11 -0,16 -0,22 
   
(-0,88) (-1,32) (-1,76) 
Proportion of busy + 
 
-0,24* -0,21 -0,21 
   
(-2,07) (-1,82) (-1,74) 
Blockholder on CC - 
 
-0,05 -0,04 -0,01 
   
(-0,66) (-0,60) (-0,09) 
CEO variables 
     
CEO tenure + 
  
0,03* 0,02 
    
(2,37) (1,46) 
Ln (CEO age) + 
  
-0,60 -0,29 
    
(-1,58) (-0,71) 
CEO ownership - 
  
9,75 11,57 
    
(1,26) (1,49) 
Constant 
 
6,91*** 7,16*** 9,07*** 7,73*** 
  
(17,66) (18,06) (6,46) (4,97) 
State dummy 
 
No No No Yes 
Industry and year dummies 
 
No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 
 
0,683 0,701 0,710 0,723 
F-statistic 
 
76,789*** 42,331*** 34,169*** 20,947*** 
Observations   177 177 177 177 
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7.3.4. Robustness  
 
The robustness of the results was tested by measuring company performance with accounting-
based return, instead of market-based return. More specifically, all the regressions were re-run 
by applying ROA, in place of stock return. The results which are not reported here, point out 
that the statistical relationships presented earlier in this study are robust to alternative 
performance measure. In more detail, the results about the association between the 
compensation committee variables and different measures of CEO compensation are virtually 
unchanged. The only noteworthy change concerned the relationship between the proportion of 
busy directors and total CEO compensation in Model 2. Specifically, the coefficient for the 
proportion of busy directors was narrowly (t-statistic –1,82) no longer statistically significant. 
With regard to control variables, there were only two noteworthy changes. First, ROA had no 
statistically significant association with CEO cash compensation or total compensation, unlike 
stock return which had a significant positive relationship with both compensation measures. 
Second, the positive relationship between M/B ratio and CEO compensation was even 
stronger and more prevalent in the regressions where stock return was replaced by ROA.   
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of compensation committee composition 
on the level of CEO compensation. Executive compensation is an essential part of the internal 
governance of the company. More specifically, executive compensation is an instrument to 1) 
motivate the executives to work harder and to act in accordance with shareholder interests 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Murphy 1990), 2) attract and retain talented 
executives (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Conyon 2006) and 3) strengthen the 
implementation of the company strategy and goals (e.g. the Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code 2010). Designing and preparing executive compensation is usually assigned to the 
compensation committee (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak 2003; Conyon and He 2004). 
Consequently, analyzing the relationship between the organ setting and preparing executive 
compensation and the level of CEO compensation is of high importance.  
 
In addition to the importance and topicality of the issue, the research was motivated by the 
divergence in the results of the previous compensation committee studies as well as the lack 
of Finnish evidence on the subject. In more detail, the earlier studies have reported conflicting 
findings about the relationship between, for example, insider directors and CEO 
compensation.  Second, the majority of the compensation committee studies have been 
conducted with U.S. and U.K. data. Specifically, I was not aware of any study performed with 
Finnish data that focuses exclusively on the compensation committees and studies, in detail, 
how its composition affects the level of CEO compensation. As a consequence this thesis 
contributed to the compensation committee literature in two ways: 1) by providing new 
evidence on this controversial subject and 2) by presenting novel evidence from Finland, 
where also the corporate governance system is different compared to the U.S. and U.K.   
 
The methods of this study consisted of the use of the ordinary least squares (OLS) linear 
regression method to analyze the relationship between compensation committee composition 
and the level of CEO compensation. The composition of the compensation committee was 
analyzed by using five variables which were: 1) the proportion of non-independent directors, 
2) the proportion of long-serving directors, 3) the proportion of CEO-directors, 4) the 
proportion of busy directors and 5) the presence of a blockholder on the compensation 
committee. CEO compensation was measured by using three different instruments, which 
were base salary, cash compensation and total compensation. 
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8.1. Summary of the main findings 
 
The main findings of this study are summarized in Table 14 below. As can be seen, the 
proportion of non-independent directors, long-serving directors and busy directors proved to 
be statistically significant factors in CEO compensation. Unexpectedly, however, they all had 
a statistically significant negative association with the level of CEO compensation. The other 
compensation committee characteristics, i.e. the proportion of CEO-directors and the presence 
of a blockholder on the compensation committee, had no statistically significant relationship 
with CEO compensation. Although to be exact, the coefficient for the proportion of CEO-
directors was narrowly statistically significant in Model 4 of the CEO base salary regression. 
Nevertheless, because its coefficient in the other eight models was statistically insignificant, 
as revealed by Table 14, it is justifiably regarded as an insignificant factor in CEO 
compensation. 
 
The proportion of non-independent directors clearly had the strongest effect on CEO 
compensation. In more detail, the proportion of non-independent directors had a statistically 
significant negative effect on all three CEO compensation measures.  The negative effect was 
especially strong on the level of CEO base salary and CEO cash compensation. The 
proportion of long-serving directors had the second strongest effect on the level of CEO 
compensation. More specifically, the proportion of long-serving directors was associated with 
statistically significantly lower CEO cash compensation and total CEO compensation. With 
total CEO compensation, the negative association was statistically stronger. Finally, the 
proportion of busy directors had the least strong effect on CEO compensation. To be exact, 
the proportion of busy directors had a statistically significant negative relationship with CEO 
base salary. In addition, the proportion of busy directors had a significant negative coefficient 
in one out of three models both in CEO cash compensation and total compensation 
regressions, as can be seen in Table 14 below.    
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Table 14. Summary of regression results for compensation committee 
variables   
This Table presents the summary of the OLS regression results for the 
compensation committee variables. In more detail, the results of the CEO base 
salary, CEO cash compensation and total CEO compensation regressions for 
compensation committee variables are reported. Symbols *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0,1% level, respectively. 
  Pred. Sign Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CEO base salary 
    
Proportion of non-independent + -0,39*** -0,41*** -0,45*** 
Proportion of long-serving + 0,05 0,03 0,01 
Proportion of CEOs + -0,07 -0,10 -0,12* 
Proportion of busy + -0,14* -0,12* -0,08 
Blockholder on CC - 0,03 0,03 0,06 
CEO cash compensation 
    
Proportion of non-independent + -0,37** -0,43*** -0,55*** 
Proportion of long-serving + -0,09 -0,16* -0,20* 
Proportion of CEOs + -0,01 -0,05 -0,08 
Proportion of busy + -0,17* -0,14 -0,12 
Blockholder on CC - 0,05 0,04 0,07 
Total CEO compensation 
    
Proportion of non-independent + -0,17 -0,24 -0,39* 
Proportion of long-serving + -0,25* -0,35** -0,39** 
Proportion of CEOs + -0,11 -0,16 -0,22 
Proportion of busy + -0,24* -0,21 -0,21 
Blockholder on CC - -0,05 -0,04 -0,01 
 
 
The finding of a statistically significant negative relationship between the proportion of non-
independent directors and CEO compensation is opposite to the corporate governance 
guidelines and the general conception of the non-independent directors. Accordingly, the 
results suggest that, instead of being less efficient to limit CEO compensation, the non-
independent directors are, in fact, more efficient in restricting the level of CEO compensation. 
This finding, although unexpected, is not without statistical support as turned out in 
Subsection 7.3.1 (e.g. Boyd 1994; Sapp 2008). In addition, there exists some reasoning in 
compensation literature explaining why non-independent directors might, in fact, be more 
effective at restricting CEO compensation.  
 
First, Daily et al. (1998) stated that non-independent directors could be especially reluctant to 
compensate CEOs excessively because, they are aware of the intense scrutiny that is targeted 
especially at them as non-independent directors and at CEO compensation in general. Second, 
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it is expressed, for example by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), that the informational 
advantage enjoyed by insider directors enables them to evaluate and reward executives more 
optimally. This second explanation, however, can be regarded only as a partial explanation for 
my finding because, as explained earlier, non-independent director is a much more extensive 
concept than insider director (see Appendix 1 for further information). 
 
The result of a statistically significant negative association between the proportion of long-
serving directors and CEO compensation is contrary to Hypothesis 2. Consequently, the 
finding implies that the long-serving directors, in fact, are not less likely to constrain the level 
of CEO compensation but rather quite the contrary. Even though the finding was surprising, 
Sun et al. (2009a) have reported parallel results. Additionally, compensation literature offers 
at least one plausible explanation for why long-serving directors could, actually, be more 
likely to limit CEO compensation. Vafeas (2003b) brought up the expertise hypothesis, 
according to which long-serving directors are associated with a greater commitment, 
experience and competence, thus making them more efficient monitors of the managers.  
 
Finally, the finding of a negative relationship, although not a particularly strong one, between 
the proportion of busy directors and the level of CEO compensation is in contradiction with 
the general conception of busy directors. Accordingly, the results reported here suggest that 
busy directors are, in fact, effective at restricting the level of CEO compensation. This 
finding, although surprising, is supported by the results of Sun et al. (2009a). Furthermore, it 
is suggested, for example by Cahan et al. (2005), that additional directorships could reflect the 
director’s reputation and expertise, which could explain the finding.  
 
In summary it can be stated, that in the Finnish listed companies during the sample period 
2006-2009, non-independent compensation committee members were not less efficient to 
restrict the level of CEO compensation, but rather the opposite. Consequently, this finding 
challenges, to some degree, the functionality of the recent corporate governance guidelines 
regarding director independence. Similarly, the results indicated that neither long-serving 
directors nor busy directors were less effective at limiting CEO compensation, as is generally 
assumed, but rather quite the contrary. Accordingly, these results question, to some extent, the 
harmfulness of both long-serving directors and busy directors.  
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8.2. Suggestions for further research 
 
This study suggests at least three possible directions for further research. First, one limitation 
of this thesis is, that it does not analyze the effect of compensation committee composition on 
the structure of CEO compensation. By structure I denote the mix between fixed and variable 
compensation or between short-term and long-term compensation. These are important 
features when examining the appropriateness of the compensation package. Accordingly, 
studying the relationship between compensation committee composition and the structure of 
CEO compensation would be of high importance.   
 
Second, another limitation of this thesis is that the measure of total CEO compensation does 
not include pension plans. Pension plans, however, may play an important role in total CEO 
compensation for at least two reasons: 1) the companies may use pension plans to camouflage 
the total amount of compensation because of a lower transparency of pension plans (Bebchuk 
et al. 2003) and 2) pension benefits may comprise a considerable part of total compensation of 
the CEO (e.g. the Finnish Corporate governance Code 2010). Consequently, analyzing the 
effect of compensation committee composition on total CEO compensation including pension 
plans would produce valuable additional information about this relationship. In addition, it 
could be intriguing to study the effect of compensation committee composition solely on the 
pension benefits of the CEO.  
 
Finally, this study focuses on the compensation committee as a whole, including all the 
compensation committee members. However, Main, Jackson, Pymm and Wright (2008) 
discovered that the compensation committee chair plays a key role on the compensation 
committee. Accordingly, it would be of interest to concentrate solely on the compensation 
committee chair, and study how the characteristics of the chair affect CEO compensation. 
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Appendix 1. Evaluation of director independence 
 
The evaluation of director independence is based on the recommendations of the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Codes, which the companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
are expected to follow. The data for the compensation committee variables is from the years 
2006-2009, during which the Finnish Corporate Governance Code was renewed. More 
specifically, in the end of 2008 the Securities Market Association issued the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code 2008 to replace the Corporate Governance Recommendation for 
Listed Companies of 2003. Accordingly, in the annual reports of 2006 and 2007 the 
companies have evaluated director independence based on the Corporate Governance 
Recommendation for Listed Companies of 2003, whereas in the annual reports of 2008 and 
2009 the companies have employed the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2008 to analyze 
director independence. 
 
Fortunately, however, the recommendation concerning the evaluation of director 
independence has not changed materially. More precisely, the recommendation about the 
evaluation of director independence is otherwise similar in both codes, except that there are 
two additional criteria in the Corporate Governance Code of 2008. These two criteria concern 
the director who is or has been in the past three years the auditor of the company or in a 
professional relationship with the auditor, and the director who has been a non-executive 
director over 12 successive years. These two criteria, i.e. point f) and point j), are highlighted 
with italics in Table 15 below, which replicates the Recommendation 15 of the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code 2008, to the extent that it concerns director independence of the 
company (not director independence of the significant shareholders).  
 
Hence, in Table 15 we can see the criteria by which the independence of the director is 
evaluated, according to the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2008. If we exclude the 
points f) and j) from Table 15, we have the criteria employed by the Corporate Governance 
Recommendation for Listed Companies of 2003 to evaluate director independence. Although 
the requirements for the director independence have tightened slightly in the Corporate 
Governance Code 2008, this had no effect on the results. Specifically, in the data set of this 
study, there was not even a single case where the company determined its director to be non-
independent of the company based on these two additional criteria.  
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Finally, I gathered the data about non-independent directors from the annual reports of the 
companies. The director was regarded as non-independent in this study if the company itself 
reported in its annual report, that the director was not independent of the company. In other 
words, I have not tried to make my own assessment about director independence, but trusted 
the companies’ own evaluation. In my opinion, this is an appropriate solution because the 
companies have informational advantage to evaluate the independence of their directors.  
 
 
Table 15. Recommendation 15 - Evaluation of independence 
This Table presents the part of the Recommendation 15 of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2008 
that deals with the director independence of the company. The additional criteria compared to the 
Corporate Governance Recommendation for Listed Companies of 2003 are highlighted with italics. 
The board shall evaluate the independence of the directors and report which directors it determines to be 
independent of the company. A director is not independent of the company, if 
a) the director has an employment relationship or service contract with the company; 
b) the director has had an employment relationship or service contract with the company in the last three 
years prior to the commencement of board membership;  
c) the director receives from the company or from members of its operative management not insignificant 
remuneration for services or other advice not connected with the duties of the board, e.g. consulting 
assignments with the company; 
d) the director belongs to the operative management of another company, and the two companies have, or 
have had in the past year, a customer, supplier or cooperation relationship significant to the other 
company; 
e) the director belongs to the operative management of a company whose director is a member of the 
operative management of the first-mentioned company (interlocking control relationship); or  
f) the director is, or has been in the past three years, the auditor of the company, a partner or an 
employee of the present auditor, or the director is a partner or an employee in an audit firm that has been 
the company’s auditor in the past three years.  
In addition, the board may, based on its overall evaluation, determine that a director is not independent of 
the company. E.g., the following circumstances shall be taken into account when making the overall 
evaluation of independence: 
i) the director participates in the same performance-related or share-related remuneration scheme as the 
management of the company, which may be of substantial financial significance to the director; 
j) the director has been a non-executive director for more than 12 consecutive years; 
k) private or legal persons who are related parties of the director have such circumstances as described in 
this recommendation; or 
l) the company is aware of other factors that may compromise the independence of the director. 
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Appendix 2. Company-specific information about compensation committee composition 
This Appendix presents company-specific information about compensation committee composition for the 
sample companies. The values of the variables measuring compensation committee composition are 
company-specific averages. In computing the averages, only the years in which the company was included in 
the sample were taken into account. For example, if the company is included in the sample in all four years 
during 2006-2009 (i.e. four firm-year observations) then the yearly proportions of a variable are first added up 
and then divided by four, to reach the average value of the variable. Abbreviation CC below refers to the 
compensation committee. 
Company 
Average proportion 
of non-independent 
directors on CC 
Average proportion 
of long-serving 
directors on CC 
Average proportion 
of CEO-directors on 
CC 
Average proportion 
of busy directors on 
CC 
Affecto Oyj 0,00 0,13 0,38 0,13 
Ahlström Oyj 0,00 0,33 0,33 0,78 
Alma Media Oyj 0,00 0,21 0,00 0,46 
Amer Sports Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,13 0,58 
Aspocomp Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 
Atria Oyj 0,00 0,42 0,17 0,83 
Cargotec Oyj 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,75 
Citycon Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,63 0,85 
Comptel Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,67 
Cramo Oyj 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,69 
Digia Oyj 0,22 0,22 0,28 0,11 
Elcoteq SE 0,00 0,50 0,10 0,33 
Elisa Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,58 0,58 
Etteplan Oyj 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 
Exel Composites Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,67 
Finnair Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,25 0,50 
Fiskars Oyj 0,13 0,00 0,52 0,35 
Fortum Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,61 
F-Secure Oyj 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,67 
Glaston Oyj 0,00 0,50 0,50 0,75 
HKScan Oyj 0,33 0,50 0,33 0,67 
Huhtamäki Oyj 0,00 0,33 0,50 0,50 
Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj 0,00 0,69 0,44 0,38 
Ixonos Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,29 
Kemira Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,58 
Keskisuomalainen Oyj 0,17 0,83 0,17 0,67 
Kesko Oyj 0,58 0,00 0,00 0,17 
Kone Oyj 0,33 0,33 0,00 0,42 
Konecranes Oyj 0,25 0,38 0,44 0,75 
Lemminkäinen Oyj 0,11 0,44 0,22 0,56 
Metso Oyj 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,25 
M-Real Oyj 0,33 0,56 0,33 0,67 
Neste Oil Oyj 0,08 0,00 0,25 0,50 
Nokia Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,64 0,44 
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 0,00 0,22 0,44 0,67 
Nordea Oyj 0,00 0,50 0,42 0,83 
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Appendix 2. Continued 
Company 
Average proportion 
of non-independent 
directors on CC 
Average proportion 
of long-serving 
directors on CC 
Average proportion 
of CEO-directors on 
CC 
Average proportion 
of busy directors on 
CC 
Oral Hammaslääkärit Oyj 0,11 0,00 0,28 0,89 
Oriola-KD Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,33 1,00 
Orion Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,67 
Outokumpu Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,69 0,46 
Pohjola Pankki Oyj 0,67 0,42 0,67 0,83 
Pöyry Oyj 0,00 0,40 0,33 0,20 
Raisio Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 
Rapala Oyj 0,00 0,50 0,08 0,33 
Rautaruukki Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,58 0,50 
Sampo Group Oyj 0,36 0,40 0,29 0,76 
Sanoma Oyj 0,23 0,34 0,23 0,00 
Sponda Oyj 0,00 0,11 0,00 0,56 
Stockmann Oyj 0,00 0,81 0,50 0,81 
Stora Enso Oyj 0,00 0,25 0,25 0,42 
Tecnotree Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,75 
Tectia Oyj 0,00 0,42 0,00 0,58 
TeliaSonera AB 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,85 
Tieto Oyj 0,00 0,25 0,38 0,75 
Tiimari Oyj 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,67 
Turvatiimi Oyj 0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 0,15 0,00 0,08 0,08 
Vacon Oyj 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,67 
Wärtsilä Oyj 0,17 0,08 0,67 0,33 
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Appendix 3. Variance inflation factors (VIF) for explanatory variables 
This Appendix presents the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the explanatory 
variables in all four models. In Model 4, Industrials is used as benchmark industry 
and 2007 as benchmark year and, as a consequence, these variables are not included 
here. Highest value is bolded. 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Stock return 1,11 1,14 1,16 2,68 
Ln (sales) 1,04 1,13 1,34 1,80 
20% block 1,03 1,26 1,29 1,43 
M/B ratio 1,25 1,31 1,31 1,69 
Volatility 1,13 1,15 1,16 2,33 
Proportion of non-independent 
 
1,15 1,18 1,63 
Proportion of long-serving 
 
1,09 1,18 1,41 
Proportion of CEOs 
 
1,08 1,16 1,26 
Proportion of busy 
 
1,08 1,12 1,37 
Blockholder on CC 
 
1,41 1,45 1,59 
CEO tenure 
  
1,45 1,99 
Ln (CEO age) 
  
1,45 1,71 
CEO ownership 
  
1,19 1,25 
State 
   
2,18 
Materials 
   
2,21 
Consumer discretionary 
   
2,33 
Consumer staples 
   
1,55 
Health care 
   
1,44 
Financials 
   
2,01 
IT 
   
2,05 
Year 2008 
   
1,84 
Year 2009 
   
3,24 
Year 2010       2,98 
 
